The Impact of TTIP: The underlying economic model and comparisons.  CEPS Special Report No. 93/13 October 2014.
[TTIP Series No. 1] by Pelkmans, Jacques. et al.
  
This paper is the first in a special series of CEPS reports on the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The study was commissioned by 
the Ex-Ante Impact Assessment Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment 
and European Added Value, within the Directorate General for Parliamentary 
Research Services (DG EPRS) of the General Secretariat of the European 
Parliament, at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on 
International Trade (INTA). The main conclusions were presented to the MEPs 
on 1 April 2014 in the INTA Committee. The study is also published at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/528798/IPOL
-JOIN_ET%282014%29528798_EN.pdf.  
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors only and do not 
necessarily represent those of the European Parliament, CEPS or CPB 
Netherlands. 
ISBN 978-94-6138-419-5 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise – without the prior permission of CEPS. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) 
© Centre for European Policy Studies 2014 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment 
Partnership 
The Impact of TTIP 
The underlying economic model 
 and comparisons 
Jacques Pelkmans, Arjan Lejour, Lorna Schrefler, 
Federica Mustilli and Jacopo Timini 
No. 93 / October 2014 
[TTIP Series No. 1] 
Abstract 
What are the economic and other impacts of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership? 
At the request of the European Parliament, CEPS has provided an appraisal of the TTIP Impact 
Assessment carried out by the European Commission, with special elaboration of the underlying 
economic model. The methodology applied by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 
for this economic modelling is analysed in depth, together with the assumptions used to make 
TTIP amenable to an economic appraisal. The research paper also compares the IA on TTIP with 
selected previous empirical economic assessments of EU trade agreements and with a set of 
alternative studies on TTIP itself. In reading our findings, two central caveats should be kept in 
mind that affect any analysis of the CGE model included in the European Commission’s Impact 
Assessment. First, TTIP is a rather unusual bilateral trade agreement; and second, TTIP is so 
wide-ranging that an alternative approach, such as the so-called ‘partial’ (equilibrium) approach 
– already a second-best solution – would be totally inappropriate to the case under examination. 
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Executive Summary 
The empirical economic analysis underlying the European Commission’s Impact Assessment 
(IA) of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (European Commission, 
2013) is particularly difficult because TTIP is an unusual bilateral trade agreement.1 Apart from 
the sheer economic size of the two partners and their economic intercourse today, its nature is 
more like a wide-ranging regulatory agreement, with some elements of classical trade 
agreements as well. The regulatory core of TTIP makes it extremely difficult for economists to 
come to grips with the expected economic meaning of the outcome of the negotiations. NTBs 
(non-tariff barriers, in fact, mostly ‘regulatory barriers’) and regulatory heterogeneity between 
the US and the EU create ‘trade costs’ for market access, both ways, but it is exceedingly hard 
to assess authoritatively what the trade costs are and what their consequences might be, 
whether for goods or services. Both the nature of TTIP as foreseen, and the sheer economic 
size of actual transatlantic economic intercourse, are important reasons for decision-makers, if 
not the public at large, to want to understand more about the potential economic gains of these 
wide-ranging negotiations than just taking the core figures from the European Commission’s 
IA. This agreement might be of strategic significance and the economic stimulus that it might 
bring to the signatories, and possibly to third countries, could be important.  
This study, carried out by CEPS at the request of the European Parliament, analyses the 
appropriateness and validity of the methodology – in particular, the economic model – behind 
the European Commission’s IA, by comparing its results, methodology, assumptions and 
findings with those of other recent IAs on EU trade and investment agreements. Indeed, 
simply using expected (EU and US) economic welfare gains or the simulated impact on flows 
of goods and services, without having any appreciation of the underlying methods (and their 
                                                   
* Jacques Pelkmans is Senior Fellow at CEPS and Professor at the College of Europe; Arjan Lejour is 
Programme Leader in Public Finance at CPB Netherlands; Lorna Schrefler is Research Fellow at CEPS; 
and Federica Mustilli and Jacopo Timini are Researchers at CEPS. The authors are grateful to the IMPA 
Unit of the European Parliament for the permission to republish the report as a CEPS publication.  
Although the subject matter concerns CGE modelling of the effects of TTIP effects on trade and GDP, every effort 
has been made to keep this report non-technical in the main text and, to some extent, also in the annexes. 
1 The IA under examination is meant to support the Commission’s recommendation to the Council 
requesting a mandate to negotiate. 
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limits), and without having much of an idea of alternative ways of simulating TTIP’s effects 
(and their results, if available), would seem to be too shallow a basis for sound debate. 
The study is composed of four chapters. We begin by presenting in chapter 1 the Commission’s 
IA and the methodology applied by the background study2 carried out by the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR, 2013a), followed by an analysis of the assumptions through 
which TTIP has been streamlined for purposes of economic analysis (chapter 2). In chapter 3, 
the study compares the IA of TTIP with selected previous empirical economic assessments of 
EU trade agreements. The few alternative studies on TTIP are compared in chapter 4. The 
conclusions that are then drawn on the basis of the analysis respond to the specific questions 
raised in the terms of reference for this study. 
The Commission’s IA and its methodology are generally coherent with the IA Guidelines,3 
even if IAs of draft mandates for EU trade negotiations are not fully comparable with regular 
IAs for legislative proposals.  
The GTAP Computable General Equilibrium (CGE model), which was run to assess the 
potential impacts of the agreement, represents the ‘state-of-the-art’ in economics. The present 
authors are not aware of any better tool with which to estimate the long-term impacts of such 
a complicated trade agreement. This approach also has several advantages. First, CGE allows 
modelling the behaviour of different actors in several markets in the entire economy, including 
many sectors. Second, the GTAP-8 database (which has been used) provides a powerful and 
reliable set of data. This matters a lot because the data requirements for many countries (in 
this case, 40), many sectors (20), several types of markets and the baseline scenario are 
extremely demanding.  
However, there is no such thing as a perfect economic model. Even this CGE approach has 
drawbacks, such as the (unrealistically) flexible labour market, the peculiarities of how 
investments are included, the lack of innovation and productivity-growth effects in enterprises 
of different sizes. 
Environmental impacts have been adequately assessed, insofar as CO2 emissions are 
concerned, but there are many environmental aspects other than climate that have not been 
included in the IA. 
With respect to social impacts, the CEPR study simulates the effects of reallocating labour 
between sectors and wage changes for low- and high-skilled workers. Free trade agreements 
modelled by CGE normally do not deliver employment effects as they assume perfect 
equilibrium between supply and demand of labour in the long run. With production increases, 
however, more labour is demanded in a specific sector, which in turn leads to higher wages; 
if such wage increases were restrained (or fixed real wages were assumed), such incipient 
wage increases would appear as employment increases. Even though today’s CGE models do 
not include effects on employment, one might interpret wage effects in this way, or one might 
study carefully the inter-sectoral reallocation of workers in the model. In the recent literature, 
the only possibility to model unemployment effects (in modern CGE models) would have been 
to incorporate a new theory of unemployment (also known as ‘search unemployment’) that 
allows the creation of new jobs or to hypothesise that changes in wages are very sensitive to 
change in labour demand.  
                                                   
2 “Reducing Transatlantic barriers to Trade and Investment – An Economic Assessment”, Final Project 
report delivered in March 2013 under Implementing Framework Contract TRADE10/A2/A16 by CEPR 
consortium. 
3 SEC (2009) 92, Impact Assessment Guidelines. 
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The sample of sectors would seem to be reasonable, especially because the sectors where TTIP 
is expected to have major effects are included in the IA. It is true that GTAP-8 has more than 
50 sectors, but the costs (‘tariff equivalent’) of US and EU NTBs are only known for a group of 
20 aggregated sectors. In this exercise, the positive spill-overs of the TTIP ‘regulatory part’ to 
third countries has been brought into the model, albeit in a very simple way: a share (in 
percent) of the benefit of NTB removal would spill over to other trading partners. This spill-
over share (one-fifth in the ambitious scenario) is arbitrarily postulated by CEPR. In the 
present report to the European Parliament, we have attempted to provide some economic 
underpinning of the likelihood of an incentive for spill-overs of TTIP. Although a limited 
exercise, it does show that spill-overs beyond the five closest economic neighbours of TTIP 
(Mexico, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) are not likely without explicit incentives. 
So-called ‘domino’ effects to the largest trading countries in the world should not be taken for 
granted, unless plurilateral agreements are offered or bilateral agreements, e.g. Mutual 
Recognition Agreements, are simplified on the basis of TTIP results. For the purpose of spill-
overs, the sample of countries (now 40) could have been larger, especially given the effects on 
developing countries that export the type of goods, subject to regulatory convergence, to TTIP 
partners. 
More should be done here than we have been able to do, especially by bringing in a sectoral 
perspective and distinguishing different methods of regulatory convergence, e.g. 
harmonisation versus mutual recognition.  
On policy options, a baseline scenario, drawn on the current state of EU-US trade and 
investment relations, is adequately analysed – more and refined analysis is of course possible 
but would not add much value for the purpose of using the CGE-GTAP model, as this model 
can only handle rather stylised approaches anyway (and no other model would be capable of 
yielding more in this respect).  
The predominance of NTBs, reflecting regulatory barriers to economic intercourse across the 
Atlantic, is fully justified, as they reflect a core problem in TTIP. But it is also extremely difficult 
to address them properly in any economic model and very few examples exist where this has 
been attempted. The cost of regulatory barriers (that is, tariff equivalents of NTBs) is a major 
problem and the background study supporting the Commission’s IA has done what is safe: 
relying on the elaborate and wide-ranging study of Ecorys (2009a), which is second-to-none 
(except for services). We discuss in some detail the technical procedure of estimating the trade 
costs of NTBs in TTIP, with some critical notes. The ‘actionability’ (that is, how much of the 
costs of such NTBs can be reduced in TTIP) of NTBs is essentially based on the insights of the 
many sectoral experts involved in the Ecorys study. In any event, a less ambitious scenario 
and a more ambitious one, as to actionability, have been used, and this is to be applauded.  
As to the simulation of the ‘real’ world economy, we show that – when comparing different 
IAs of recent trade agreements – quite different growth paths have been used and this may 
hinder the comparability of results between them. Given the crisis, the assumed path in the 
TTIP IA seems not unreasonable. The options analysed appear sufficient to us, because further 
refinement in an analysis like this would not bring much added value for MEPs. It should be 
noted that the effects on cross-border investments are derived from a somewhat ad hoc 
analysis outside the CGE model. 
The economic findings would seem plausible for TTIP signatories, although they are too 
conservative in services due to low costs of NTBs in services compared to another study by 
Fontagné et al. (2013).  
Comparing results between different IAs should be handled with care. We have tried to 
compare the economic methodology applied in the background EU-US study with that used 
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to analyse two other free trade agreements, all based on quantifying NTBs. The three studies, 
namely EU-US, EU-Japan and EU-Canada, exhibit profound differences, both from a 
theoretical and methodological perspective. We conclude that the different CGE estimations 
present several divergences in the following areas: market structures (evenly), underlying data 
used for macroeconomic forecasts, theory and indicators of NTB costs and policy scenarios.  
Such multiple divergences are bound to influence the final results of each study, i.e. specific 
gains (or losses) over time and sectorally as well as between countries. Therefore, arguing that 
one agreement would be more (or less) beneficial than another only on the basis of the CGE 
estimations discussed would not make much economic sense and may be misleading. 
Our report also analyses the modelling, assumptions and findings of all recent studies that 
analyse the potential impacts of the EU-US free trade agreement. We have divided them into 
two groups: one includes two reports that employ methodologies and assumptions quite 
distinct from CEPR. The second group includes what we have called ‘satellite studies’ because 
they represent only different applications of the main CEPR report on which the Commission 
IA is based. CGE modelling is the preferred one by all of them. 
While the second group uses the same methodology as applied by the Commission IA, the 
first group merits careful scrutiny. 
Fontagné et al. (2013) show that TTIP is only of some economic importance if one moves 
beyond mere tariff removal to partial removal of NTBs, confirming the finding of the CEPR 
study. However, Fontagné et al. (2013) has approached the NTBs in services differently. For 
nine services sectors they calculated average protection (based on a sample of 65 countries) 
with a different technique. The upshot is that the costs of services NTBs turn out to be much 
higher than those of Ecorys (2009a) used by CEPR. Nevertheless, final findings on GDP effects 
do not vary greatly with the ones reported by the IA; indeed, the final GDP effect for both 
signatories is slightly more conservative (0.3% for both), probably due to the higher costs of 
post-TTIP NTBs computed. 
The spill-over effects in Fontagné et al. (2013) are defined as a further reduction of 5% of trade 
restrictiveness of NTMs (non-tariff measures) for third countries as a result of the regulatory 
convergence process for the two signatories. As in the Commission IA, the percentage is based 
on a debate among expert groups. 
The second study is the Bertelsmann/GED report on the effects of TTIP. It provides a different 
CGE approach based on a daring simulated scenario. The idea behind the simulation is that 
TTIP, if ambitious, might accomplish a level of market integration, including the reduction or 
removal of NTBs, similar to NAFTA or even the EU internal market. This assumption is clearly 
unrealistic and it drives the enormous country-specific effects (also in terms of negative and 
positive spill-overs) reported in the study. We show with a simple example why the results in 
the Bertelsmann study are not just an extreme outlier compared to the CEPR and other studies, 
but are impossible under any reasonable assumption. However, from a technical point of view, 
the Bertelsmann study has some merits, such as its far-reaching and wide sample of countries 
and the explicit treatment of unemployment. 
Introduction 
In 2006, the EU ended a seven-year moratorium on new bilateral or regional free trade area 
agreements, mainly in order to facilitate the multilateral trade negotiations in the Doha Round. 
Ever since, the EU has pursued an ambitious strategy of negotiating modern bilateral and 
regional free trade areas (FTAs) with strategic trading partners and others willing and able to 
conclude deep and comprehensive treaties. The agreements concluded so far are rather different 
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from FTAs of the past, at least if one solely pays attention to forms of market integration 
outside Europe.4 Indeed, the recent agreement with South Korea is ambitious, deep and 
comprehensive. The intentions of the current EU-Japan negotiations and new FTAs with 
Singapore and Canada are probably no different.  
However, despite this much-higher gear in FTA negotiations and the resulting intrusive FTA-
plus regimes, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, begun 
in 2013, are nevertheless in a class of their own. There are essentially two reasons: the nature 
of the agreed negotiation strategy of the partners and the sheer economic size of transatlantic 
economic intercourse. The nature of the negotiations is clear from the report of the scoping 
exercise by the United States-European Union High-Level Working Group on Jobs and 
Growth (US-EU HLWG) (2013) and confirmed, so far, by subsequent negotiations and 
stakeholder briefings. The nature and ambition are unique, due principally to three factors: i) 
the worldwide leadership of the two parties in both old and new methods of improving market 
access (including investment); ii) the prominence of their regulatory convergence, coherence 
and/or compatibility over a very wide range of markets and policy domains and iii) the 
explicit objective of devising or upgrading rules “addressing shared global trade challenges 
and opportunities” (US-EU HLWG, 2013).  
The size of today’s transatlantic economic intercourse is also in a class of its own, as it dwarfs 
any other bilateral or even regional relationship, both in terms of flows and stocks. This has an 
immediate consequence for the empirical economic analysis of TTIP: even (percentage-wise) 
small changes in the components of this economic interdependence will quickly add up to 
considerable effects in terms of euros or dollars.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the appropriateness and validity of the methodology behind 
the European Commission’s Impact Assessment of TTIP,5 also by comparing its result with 
alternative exercises. In this respect, we discuss the assumptions and findings by comparing, 
where possible, this IA with other recent IAs on EU trade and investment agreements in terms 
of methodologies and assumptions. Both the nature of the TTIP as foreseen and the sheer 
economic size of actual transatlantic economic intercourse are important reasons for the 
European Parliament and many other decision-makers, if not the public at large, to understand 
the potential economic gains of these wide-ranging negotiations in a way that goes far beyond 
just taking note of some core figures from the European Commission’s Impact Assessment. 
The background study behind the Commission IA is CEPR (2013a), which relies on the pioneer 
study of Ecorys (2009) concerning the quantification of non-tariff measures between the EU 
and the US. Indeed, simply using expected (EU and US) economic welfare gains or the 
simulated impact on (say) the flows of goods and services, without having either any 
appreciation of the underlying methods (and their limits) or much of an idea of alternative 
ways of simulating TTIP effects (and their results, if available), would seem to offer a shallow 
basis for sound debate in the European Parliament. 
TTIP is incredibly complex and wide-ranging, much more so than in economic studies of other 
(EU) trade policy initiatives; hence, in studying this initiative, there is no way to escape from 
fairly drastic assumptions in order to be able to generate meaningful empirical results. To put 
it differently, to link in a responsible fashion the negotiation mandate for TTIP with what 
economic modelling can and cannot do, requires the acceptance of state-of-the-art economic 
modelling today. If one declines to do this, the only other way would consist of vague 
                                                   
4 In Europe, of course, the European Economic Area (EEA) is uniquely deep and wide in scope and the 
EU-Turkish customs union is fairly deep, especially in goods. 
5 European Commission (2013a). 
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qualitative economic inferences, without any rigour and without any way to scrutinise 
complex secondary and dynamic effects, and having no clue about economy-wide effects at 
all. That would fail to serve as the basis for a proper EU Impact Assessment. As the authors 
will emphasise throughout this report, it is important to fully recognise all kinds of criticisms 
one might make about economic modelling, but it is mistaken to read in such criticism any 
suggestion that intuitive insights allow greater appreciation of the TTIP as a whole. Quite the 
contrary! 
The study is structured as follows: Chapter 1 focuses on the Commission’s Impact Assessment 
and the methodology applied by the background study (CEPR, 2013a), by discussing the 
background study’s merits and drawbacks for empirical simulation. 
Chapter 2 will explain how TTIP can be stylised for economic purposes, particularly (but not 
only) in so-called ‘CGE models’ as used in the CEPR and other studies. In particular, we will 
assess the validity of the applied methodology and how they have affected the impacts both 
for signatories and third countries. Chapter 3 will compare the impact assessment of TTIP with 
selected previous empirical economic assessments of EU trade agreements. Chapter 4 will 
compare the methodology adopted for the Commission’s impact assessment of TTIP with the 
few alternative studies available. Conclusions will be then drawn on the basis of the analysis.  
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1. What the EU-US impact assessment tells us and how 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold: firstly, it will briefly assess whether the impact assessment 
(IA) on the EU-US TTIP negotiations (European Commission, 2013a) is consistent with the 
European Commission’s Impact Assessment Guidelines (European Commission, 2009). 
Subsequently, we will zoom in on the methodology and results of the economic section of the 
IA based on the CEPR (2013a) report to the European Commission and published in March 
2013. In particular, we want to explain whether the quantitative methodology used by the 
background study of the IA corresponds to the analytical needs of an ex-ante evaluation of 
such a trade agreement and whether alternative evaluation methods are possible. 
It is recognised in the policy debate that the negotiations between the EU and the US for a 
comprehensive free trade area will be different from previous agreements. This is due to the 
economic size of the signatories and their economic intercourse (hence the possible impact on 
third countries) and to the nature of the negotiations dealing mainly with the removal of non-
tariff barriers (NTBs).6 Tariff levels are a lesser problem over the North Atlantic; there are 
higher tariffs on, e.g. processed agro-food products and motor vehicles, but overall the level 
of tariffs is low (and many product lines no longer have any tariffs).  
1.1 The Commission’s IA and the Guidelines: A general assessment 
This section discusses the compliance of the European Commission’s impact assessment of the 
proposed TTIP with the Commission’s Impact Assessment Guidelines.7 Before doing so, it is 
worth mentioning an important difference between this type of analysis and other impact 
assessments routinely performed by the various directorates general (DGs) of the European 
Commission, including DG Trade. The IA under examination is meant to support the 
Commission’s recommendation to the Council requesting a mandate to negotiate. As is 
common practice since 1999, once the Commission receives the negotiating mandate, a second 
assessment procedure is launched, the “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment” (TSIA).8 As 
noted also in the Handbook for TSIA (European Commission, 2006:11), a key difference 
between these two assessments lies in the question either is meant to answer: whereas the IA 
performed before the negotiating mandate is granted explores whether action should be taken, 
the later TSIA looks at how action should be taken and what its consequences are. Moreover, 
the TSIA is undertaken during the negotiation process.9  
TSIAs are regularly performed for all major trade negotiations by the EU for the last decade 
or so. Conversely, ‘pre-negotiation IAs’, such as the TTIP IA of 2013, are rare. Indeed, 11 years 
                                                   
6 As chapter 2 will deeply analyse, quantifying NTBs and regulatory divergences is anything but easy. 
Indeed, NTBs are not by definition merely a cost – because they tend to be the consequence of domestic 
measures that deal with market failures or (sometimes) redistributive motives, hence, can be regarded 
as desirable or even necessary for the better working of markets – but they may imply more difficult 
market access, that is, a cost for foreign affiliates and trading partners (CEPR, 2013a). 
7 European Commission (2009). These guidelines, issued in January 2009, were under revision at the 
time of writing. Revised IA guidelines are expected by the end of 2014. 
8 For further details on the methodology of TSIA, see the official Handbook 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf). 
9 Another difference lies in the fact that the IA is undertaken by the Commission, although most of the 
evidence used in the assessment is often drawn from external studies; conversely, TSIAs are performed 
by external independent consultants and the Commission comments on their findings via the so-called 
“position-papers”. 
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after the introduction of the Commission’s IA system, only two examples of such IAs are 
available: for Japan (2012)10 and the US (2013).11 Yet pre-negotiation IAs seem to have become 
a more regular feature since 2012.  
CEPS has developed a scorecard of over 200 items for assessing the extent to which the IAs 
produced by the European Commission comply with the requirements included in the official 
IA Guidelines. When applied to a large number of IAs (CEPS has scored over 600 Commission 
IAs), this system allows for a rather accurate comparison of how comprehensive an individual 
IA is and can locate its main weaknesses and strengths.12 In this respect, the IA prepared for 
TTIP scores rather well in comparative terms, as it covers most of the items contained in the 
IA Guidelines. It also appears to be more comprehensive, in the variety of policy options 
considered, than the other available example of a pre-negotiation IA, for Japan. It should be 
noted, however, that when compared to traditional IAs, this type of assessment offers policy 
options that are much more limited in variety and essentially includes the ‘no policy change 
option’ as well as several variations (in depth and scope) of a possible trade agreement. There 
is little or no scope in such agreements for other approaches, such as self-regulation, the use 
of market-based mechanisms, etc., as foreseen by the IA Guidelines; hence, these alternative 
options would simply be ignored. Methodologically and in terms of the evidence base, the two 
pre-negotiation IAs are very similar and refer to the results of CGE modelling. This is in line 
with the IA Guidelines, which recommend using a specific model when it is deemed 
appropriate for a certain type of analysis.13  
Rather than the question of compliance with the Impact Assessment Guidelines (particularly 
since the pre-negotiation IA is only a first analytical step that will be followed by the TSIA), 
what is perhaps more interesting is to examine the position of this IA in the general impact 
assessment process of the European Commission. Three points can be made in this respect: 
 The first concerns the policy options under examination. As mentioned, these are not 
particularly varied. If it were not for the fact that they are meant to support a request for 
the mandate to negotiate, in a traditional IA they would be seen as the classical set of 
options that ‘artificially’ pre-empt other courses of action and ‘justify’ the preferred 
option. While such criticism is less appropriate in this particular case, the assumptions 
and the different combinations of the various scenarios leading to the proposed options 
may not be fully exploited for the purpose of exploring all possibilities. With respect to 
policy options retained for analysis, the TTIP IA scores better than the IA for Japan. 
 Another important point is the link between the IA and the proposal. Contrary to most 
other IAs, the accompanying TTIP proposal (as with the China IA) was confidential at 
the time and not accessible. In other words, the ‘natural’ link between the evidence base 
                                                   
10 A deep analysis on the economic modelling behind the EU-Japan IA is presented in chapter 3. 
11 Note that DG Trade performed a total of 10 IAs between 2003 and March 2014. Another example that 
can be of some relevance in the present discussion is the 2013 IA of the Recommendation for a Council 
Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on an investment agreement between the European 
Union and the People’s Republic of China. 
12 As discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Fritsch et al., 2013; Dunlop et al., 2012), the scorecard approach 
has limitations, for instance, it shows whether a certain item is analysed in an IA but cannot draw 
specific conclusions on the quality of the analysis. This limitation is less relevant when applied to a very 
large number of IAs (as the purpose is to show trends); for individual cases, the scorecard analysis can 
be complemented with a more focused approach, e.g. case study, as is done in other parts of this study. 
13 See Annex to the IA Guidelines (European Commission, 2009, p. 68). 
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provided by the IA and the proposal is broken. This in a way raises the question of the 
IA’s utility beyond the closed-circle of individuals with access to the draft mandate. On 
the other hand, given the limited number of IAs carried out before the negotiating 
mandate is granted (compared to the overall number of TSIAs), the TTIP IA can serve as 
an additional tool for accountability and, more important, sets in motion another 
mechanism, as explained below. 
 Indeed, by being undertaken as a support for the Council Recommendation, this IA is 
subsumed under the general IA process and undergoes the scrutiny of the Impact 
Assessment Board (IAB).14 The IAB uses the IA Guidelines as a reference and does not 
seem to treat this specific IA any differently than it would an assessment accompanying 
a traditional proposal.15 And indeed in its opinion,16 the IAB levelled some rather 
demanding criticism at the IA, requiring a strengthening of the problem definition, 
better integration of stakeholder consultation results, a clarification of the assumptions 
behind the policy options17 and, more importantly for the purpose of this research paper 
for the European Parliament, that the quantitative analysis provided by the CGE be 
further complemented by other quantitative and in-depth qualitative assessments of 
impacts. The resubmitted version does indeed pay more attention to those aspects and 
these additional efforts might be further pursued with the TSIA. 
1.2 The applied CGE modelling in the EU-US trade and investment 
relations 
The economic impacts of the expected TTIP that the Commission refers to are based on a 
background study by CEPR (2013a) carried out before the start of the actual negotiations. In 
order to rigorously assess the applied methodology, we have to briefly describe how it is 
technically possible to measure the impact of a free trade agreement and how this 
methodology has been applied in this specific case. 
1.2.1 CGE modelling in general?18 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)19 models are quantitative methods to describe the 
interactions among several markets and the impacts that an economic shock (such as a free 
                                                   
14 The Impact Assessment Board is a central quality control that works under the authority of the 
Commission President. It examines and provides feedback on the Commission Impact Assessments, 
being independent from the policy-making departments. 
15 This is in line with the findings of Alemanno & Meuwese (2013) as regards the IAs undertaken for 
some delegated and implementing acts. The authors noted that while IAs for these acts are becoming 
more widespread, there is no official rule in place to establish whether undertaking an IA is appropriate 
or not, but when this happens the IAB always uses the same checklist to evaluate the IA. This appears 
to be the case also for pre-negotiation IAs. 
16 European Commission (2013b, p. 154). 
17 Note that negative comments on the assumptions and the problem definition were also found in the 
IAB opinions on the IAs for Japan and for China. 
18 A large part of this sub-section is based on Lejour et al. (2006). 
19 CGE or AGE modelling has been, since the late 1980s, the standard workhorse for analysing free trade 
agreements. The most prominent examples are Harris (1984) and Cox and Harris (1985) and Brown and 
Stern (1989). These models received much attention in modelling the effects of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a few years later. Then, Hertel (1997) and his colleagues started to develop 
a common database of CGE analysis in the 1990s. The latest version has 2007 as the base year and 
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trade agreement) could have on economic variables such as GDP and trade flows as well as 
inter-sectoral adjustment for workers and capital.  
In these models, prices of goods and factor inputs are flexible, such that demand and supply 
equalise at an equilibrium price.20 In the long run, this implies that all markets that have 
interacted with each other reach equilibrium. 
CGE models thus reflect the behaviour of consumers and firms. Consumers demand the 
different consumption goods and services, and provide labour and capital to the firms. The 
consumption bundle of the different goods and services is determined so that it brings 
maximum utility to the consumer, given his budget constraint. It is normally assumed that the 
supply of labour is known. Because consumers save part of their income, they are able to 
supply capital to the firms in return for income. Consumers supply labour and firms demand 
it. Two types of labour are distinguished: high-skilled and low-skilled. It is assumed that 
labour markets are in equilibrium at the national level, i.e. no unemployment would remain, 
supply is equal to demand of labour, and that the prices of both types of labour (the wage 
rates) are flexible. For each labour type, supply and demand will become equal to the 
equilibrium wage. Normally unemployment is not modelled or projected exogenously.21 
High-skilled and low-skilled labour supply is also fixed, so consumers cannot decide to invest 
in education in order to reach a higher-skill type. 
Consumers supply the capital that firms demand. In some CGE models the capital markets are 
national. Supply has to meet demand within a country. Other CGE models, such as the GTAP 
model (as used by CEPR, 2013a) assume (rudimentary) international linkages between the 
capital markets. Then, the equality of global demand and supply determines the price of 
capital. Thus, if capital is abundant in one country (and hence relatively inexpensive), it is 
invested in another country in which capital is scarce (and relatively expensive).  
International markets for goods and services are linked with each other as well. The demand 
for a good is not only expressed in the home market, but also in foreign markets. 
CGE models assume that in each region a different variety of a good or service is being 
produced and that, in principle, consumers demand all varieties. The demand for each one of 
the varieties depends on its relative price, the substitution possibilities between the varieties, 
transportation costs, trade barriers and preferences. If the price of a particular variety goes up, 
                                                   
distinguishes about 130 regions and countries in the world and 57 economic sectors. Together with an 
easy-to-use static CGE model and many short courses, CGE modelling became more and more popular 
not only in academia but also in policy circles. 
20 The flexibility assures the following mechanism: assume that consumers’ preferences shift in favour 
of a particular good and that final demand for that good increases. Then, the price of the good will 
increase and profit-maximising firms will want to produce more and will demand more inputs, such as 
intermediary goods, capital and labour. As a result, prices in other markets, such as capital and labour, 
may increase because of the increase in demand of the final good. These sectoral linkages transmit the 
price increase of the final good to other markets. The price increases in other markets also have 
consequences for other sectors. Input prices increase depending on the production process or the 
proportion of inputs and will have effects on prices of other final goods. These are the secondary effects 
of the shift in preferences. The changes in demand and supply of final and intermediate goods, labour 
and capital go on until a new equilibrium is reached. This new equilibrium is the situation in which the 
prices balance demand and supply in all markets. 
21 In economics, a variable is exogenous to a model if it is not determined by other parameters and 
variables in the model, but is set externally and any changes to it come from external forces. 
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demand will decrease in favour of other varieties. Total demand for each variety thus depends 
on the demand in the home and foreign markets. 
There are CGE models that explicitly include the government in the model; others add 
government expenditures to (private) consumption. In all cases the behaviour of government 
is hardly modelled. CGE models include the government budget, such that the collected taxes 
on imports, on consumption and sometimes on production are equal to (export) subsidies and 
government consumption. All tax and tariff rates are assumed to be exogenous (given).  
1.2.2 The CGE modelling for the TTIP IA: The CEPR study  
The analysis of CEPR (2013a) relies on a multi-region and multi-sector type of GTAP model 
(the newest version 8), and on its huge database, including information on ‘bilateral trade’ and 
on the social accounting matrices (SAMs).22 The underlying theoretical model comprises world 
trade, production and consumption (through a representative modelling of a household) 
allowing for economies of scale and imperfect competition in a static perspective.23 Since the 
results hinge on long-run estimations,24 it is appropriate to take investment effects into 
account. However, the macro and sectoral effects of removing or reducing barriers to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) are separately analysed by CEPR (2013a), outside the CGE context. 
The modellers have also included the effect of tariff reductions, removal of export taxes, 
subsidy reduction and other international trade costs, all regulatory divergences between two 
trading partners.  
Data are included for 20 sectors25 across 11 regions26 in the world economy. Data have been 
taken exclusively from the enormous GTAP database, which represents a comprehensive and 
reliable source collected worldwide to ensure a solid representation of trade flows across 
sectors and countries and over time. 
To analyse the effect of the TTIP agreement on the economic variables of the two signatories 
(and also on those of third countries), the different scenarios are characterised by the partial 
or total removal of: current tariffs (even if the average tariff rates are bilaterally low compared 
to non-tariff measures, they nevertheless show a certain degree of heterogeneity across sectors 
                                                   
22 Following the UNEP (2005) definition, a social accounting matrix “is a presentation of a country’s 
national accounts in a matrix that elaborates the linkages between a supply and use table and sector 
accounts. An SAM measures distributional impacts using policy simulations with complete 
specification of the economy. Prices are fixed and exogenous. The model normally contains entries for 
productive activities, commodities, factors, institutions, the capital account and the ‘rest of the world’.” 
23 The assumption of imperfect competition is considered quite realistic: it implies firm level competition 
and a variety of goods supplied according to the characteristics of ‘monopolistic competition’. It also 
allows us to analyse the effects of intermediate linkages between sectors as well as the modelling of 
changes in capital stocks due to investment effects. For a discussion of the general extensions of the CGE 
modelling, refer to Annex II. 
24 For an overview of the results of the CEPR study, refer to Annex I. 
25 Sectors included in the analysis are Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries, Other Primary Sectors, 
Processed Foods, Chemicals, Electrical Machinery, Motor Vehicles, Other Transport Equipment, other 
Machinery, Metals and metal products, Wood and paper products, Other manufactures, Water 
transport, Air transport, Finance, Insurance, Business Services, Communications, Construction, 
Personal Services and Other Services.  
26 European Union, United States, Other OECD-High Income, East Europe, Mediterranean, China, 
India, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, Low Income, Rest of the World. 
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and some sectors are still affected by a relatively high level of tariffs such as motor vehicles) 
and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in goods and services. 
The definition of the policy scenarios is extremely sensitive to the degree of actionability of the 
non-tariff barriers. With this term, CEPR means the extent (expressed in a percentage share) 
to which the identified costs of a NTB or regulatory divergence can potentially be reduced 
(through various methods) by 2018, assuming a TTIP agreement that will address these 
barriers. According to the background study of Ecorys (2009a), commissioned by the European 
Commission at the time, approximately 50% of costs due to NTBs are actually removable; put 
differently, only half of the existing barriers or regulatory divergences are considered 
‘actionable’. Both this judgment, arising from a large panel of sectoral experts, and the 
estimated costs of NTBs (a difficult exercise, see further) are of course critical for the final 
results about impacts. 
Two policy options are considered, further subdivided into sub-scenarios according to the 
actual implementation of tariffs and NTBs removal.  
The first option is split into three limited scenarios, analysed as three ‘stand-alone’ possibilities 
(only tariff liberalisation, only service liberalisation and only public procurement liberalisation).27 
The second option is split into two versions of what would be expected from a Comprehensive 
Trade Partnership:  
 A less ambitious scenario including the simultaneous negotiations of the three chapters 
included in the limited agreement (98% of tariffs eliminated, 10% of services and goods 
NTBs eliminated, 25% of public procurements NTBs eliminated); or 
 An ambitious scenario removing all the actionable NTBs costs (so the 50% previously 
mentioned) as follows: 100% of tariffs eliminated, 25% of NTBs on services and goods 
eliminated and 50% of procurement NTBs eliminated.  
In the three versions of option 1, gains in terms of GDP and millions of euro are very small 
and no positive spill-overs for third countries are expected (for services, it all depends on non-
discrimination, but this is not discussed in the CEPR study). However, the negotiating effort 
would nevertheless be appreciable. Changes in bilateral trade in goods are found to be larger 
under the tariff cut compared to services or public procurement. Although the overall effects 
are not impressive, this result shows that TTIP trade flows are more sensitive to tariff cuts than 
to (here, limited) service liberalisation. The two policy options included in the comprehensive 
trade partnership (as also outlined by other studies on an EU-US trade agreement) show 
higher outcomes for both the EU and the US that can vary according to the degree of 
actionability of non-tariff removal. All the findings, both in the limited and in the 
comprehensive scenarios, incorporate (for the first time, in such a quantitative exercise) the 
effects due to the (partial) removal of non-tariff measures in public procurement. 
The purpose of the economic modelling of the policy options is to provide proxies of both 
overall quantitative impacts as well as of effects in the specific sectors affected, according to 
the different scenarios. In this respect, CGE modelling presents potential outcomes: what the 
economies would look like once the foreign trade agreements would come into force. 
However, the applied methodology can never pretend to be exhaustive as the econometric 
approach is by definition limited by fairly restrictive assumptions, with quite some distance 
from ‘reality’. At the same time, one has to realise the enormous complexity and very large 
                                                   
27 This is considered a feasible but limited outcome. Indeed, the low outcomes for both signatories do 
not seem to justify the effort of the negotiations.  
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number of calculations, combining the respective barriers to trade in some 40 countries with 
goods, services and labour markets, 20 sectors and a 10-year period for the simulations.  
To assess the methodology applied to the prospective TTIP, it is useful to shed light on two 
specific steps of the econometric exercise. The first one considers the validity of the 
assumptions imposed by the authors in order to obtain robust results that are not too far 
removed from what can be realistically achieved (as analysed in chapter 2). It is useful to bear 
in mind that modelling assumptions in this exercise, as in all econometric estimations, largely 
drive the final outcomes of the model. The second step is to discuss the structure of the model 
and the validity of the additional calculations introduced to improve the results (mostly, spill-
over effects and, separately, impacts on FDI).  
The CGE modelling also allows for sustainability impacts such as effects on labour market, 
CO2 emissions and use of natural resources. 
With respect to labour effects, it is worth noting that standard CGE models do not estimate 
changes in employment/unemployment. This follows directly from the fact that such models 
are governed by equilibrium conditions (in other words, supply equals demand of labour at 
some set of wages for skilled and low-skilled workers). Therefore, the model may show the 
reallocation of labour between sectors after TTIP has come into force, but it does not tell us 
anything about unemployment or indeed extra jobs. It does describe the wage changes for 
low- and high-skilled labour, in interaction with inter-sectoral movements of labour; together 
these ensure that there will be no unemployment (supply equal to demand). Other approaches 
to evaluate employment effects will be examined later, but such approaches have not been 
employed in the CEPR report.28  
The last addition provided by the CEPR exercise is the evaluation of the removal of restrictions 
on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and in particular for EU affiliates in the US that might be 
affected, and vice versa. The assessment is separated from CGE estimates and this different 
methodology does not allow for a comparison between trade and investment NTBs. As in the 
previous exercise, the Ecorys study reports a survey on bilateral degrees of (restricted) market 
access. While data on NTBs come from Ecorys, investments are based on Foreign Affiliate 
Trade Statistics (FATS) that more precisely capture the economic activities of foreign branches 
and affiliates.29 
1.2.3 How robust is the CGE modelling in the TTIP IA? 
Whether or not CGE models are the best for estimating the impact of comprehensive FTAs like 
TTIP can only be judged properly if one first recognises that all quantitative models have their 
limitations. First, models are by definition a simplified and stylised way of understanding the 
economy. The more complex, comprehensive and deep trade agreements are, the harder it will 
                                                   
28 Results on labour effects, CO2 emissions and use of natural resources are reported in Annex I. 
29 To capture the role of foreign-controlled affiliates under Mode 3 of GATS (providing a service by 
establishing a commercial presence), the authors opted to use Foreign Affiliates Statistics (once Foreign 
Affiliates of Trade in Service – or FATS). FDI in services, however, keeps its relevance in analysing trade 
in services under the form of investment, notwithstanding their broader coverage. FATSs indeed consist 
of variables (sales/turnover, employment, added value, number of enterprises) referred to in the overall 
operations between the direct investors and the foreign affiliates. They are defined at firm-level and 
subsequently grouped by country and sectors (Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services, 
2010, compiled by the Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United 
Nations). 
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be to include all aspects in any economic model. Deep free trade agreements include goods 
trade, services trade, direct investment, trade facilitation, procurement issues and intellectual 
property rights. Although these issues are the most important ones, this list is not complete. 
Economic models do not include all these issues. Second, modern trade agreements include 
many issues that are hard to quantify. This is not only the case for the policy instrument (TTIP), 
but also for the underlying economic mechanism and the policy impact. These limitations 
imply that we have to judge the impact assessment and corresponding CGE analysis of TTIP 
not with the yardstick of an ideal model (as there is no such thing) and ideal and abundant 
data (as this is never the case), but with the yardstick of the state-of-the-art practice of 
economists using empirical models applied to FTAs. 
The great strength of CGE modelling is that one can encompass the whole economy, with 
many markets, relying on sound microeconomic analysis in a general equilibrium context.30 It 
is therefore possible to derive the welfare effects of trade policy proposals and to link their 
effects to specific economic sectors and countries. Another advantage is the relatively clear 
mechanisms and working of the models, although the later expansions in more complex 
models have complicated the analysis. Often, the way in which regions are aggregated can 
hamper a clear understanding of the policy effects.  
CGE models have their disadvantages too (Ackerman, 2005). The assumed flexible prices 
(especially wages) create a very flexible economy, which implies full employment; dismissed 
workers will be quickly absorbed by other sectors. Even though alternative modelling options 
for the labour market have recently been developed, these are not often applied.31 Moreover, 
capital can also be reallocated very quickly to other sectors, while some capital is often fixed 
or sector-specific in actual practice. The nature of the models is static. It is hard to model the 
expansion of capital through investment and productivity improvements, let alone 
innovation. First of all, research and development is either rudimentarily or not at all 
modelled, and the productivity effects of trade liberalisation are also not included in the 
models. On both issues there have been some serious modelling efforts, but these are still not 
adopted in the core of CGE analyses. The empirical underpinning of the new mechanisms in 
particular is considered problematic. 
1.2.4 The role of employment and public procurement in the CGE modelling 
The basic structure of CGE models consists of markets with perfect competition and flexible 
prices. Introducing imperfect competition, as CEPR (2013a) has done, has now become more 
routine. Because the labour supply is fixed by region and not mobile between regions, 
employment is always equal to labour supply. Trade liberalisation scenarios do not deliver 
employment effects in these models. Quite often, however, production increases and more 
labour is demanded. As a result, wages increase. This is the typical labour market effect. 
Sometimes reports using CGE models deliver labour market effects by translating the wage 
increase in the model into employment increases. These are off-model exercises that make 
sense if wages are more or less rigid (as is often the case in Europe) and unemployment is 
substantial. Although CGE models are often criticised for their modelling of the labour market, 
the simulations are nevertheless informative about job changes between sectors. Due to trade 
                                                   
30 Partial equilibrium models cannot but ignore important feedbacks on the rest of the economy, that is, 
they lose out on important welfare effects, which remain ‘invisible’, as it were. In CEPR (2013a), this is 
exemplified by a comparison of an addition of separate sectoral effects and the overall economic effect, 
incorporating all the interactions between sectors, markets, etc. The overall effect is much larger than 
the addition of the separate effects.  
31 See in chapter 4, for instance, how the labour market has been treated in the Bertelsmann study. 
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liberalisation some sectors gain and others lose and these effects are reflected in job gains or 
losses in these sectors. In the models such labour reallocations occur very smoothly, but in 
reality they are likely to result in temporary unemployment. The amount of labour reallocation 
in the model is normally expected to be much larger than temporary unemployment that 
might be induced, because a considerable part of the mobile labour force will voluntarily look 
for other jobs and often find them (as we know from job changes on a monthly basis) and 
another part will have few problems as their work is not sector-specific and may be in demand 
at the going wage. The genuine problems are to be expected for fairly low-skilled workers with 
sector-specific knowledge who either have to move to other regions in a country or between 
(EU) countries or have to accept lower wages as their ‘sector bonus’ will evaporate.  
In principle, CGE models could be extended with wage-bargaining models and search and 
friction models to improve the modelling of the labour market.32 By incorporating these 
extensions, the model allows for unemployment. Moreover, labour supply could also become 
a variable instead of a given, by deriving a relationship between supply and the wage. 
Although various efforts have been made by incorporating these extensions in CGE models, 
there are still no standard tools that can be employed in multi-country CGE modelling. One of 
the econometric problems is estimating the behavioural equations in particular for developing 
countries. 
Deep free trade agreements also contain some provisions on the opening up of public 
procurement for foreign firms.33 Generally, CGE models neither model public procurement 
nor include public procurement scenarios as a part of the trade liberalisation. The CEPR study 
seems to be the exception, although the details of modelling the opening up of public 
procurement are not well explained. In principle, it seems possible to model public 
procurement. The underlying GTAP data contain a government sector. This sector can be 
interpreted narrowly, including, for example, only public administration, education, health 
and defence, or more broadly by including recreation, culture and sports and the utility 
sectors. It is not clear which interpretation has been chosen in the CEPR study. The problem, 
however, is that the possible discrimination towards foreign sales is difficult to quantify. But 
an NTB approach as in other sectors could be chosen. This is also done in the report; a lower 
NTB is associated with opening up public procurement. Because the effect of lower NTBs in 
services and goods is already modelled in the broader trade liberalisation scenario, the public 
procurement liberalisation is thus already included in the effects (as part of the lower NTBs in 
services). Therefore, although the results are separately shown, they cannot be added to the 
totals. The present authors are not aware of any successful attempt of modelling the opening 
of public procurement for foreign firms in CGE models. 
1.2.5 Are there any alternatives to CGE modelling? 
The most prominent alternative for CGE analysis is gravity analysis. This is mainly an 
econometric application that tries to explain bilateral trade between two countries.34 This is 
                                                   
32 See also the overview on labour markets in CGE modelling of Boeters & Savard (2013). 
33 Public purchases are large markets: according to the OECD, on average 12% of GDP in OECD 
countries. The OECD and Vogel (2009) conclude that costs savings in public procurement and 
transparency can increase economic growth. Trionfetti (2000) finds that import shares in public 
procurement are substantially lower than in private procurement, suggesting a significant ‘home bias’ 
for public procurement. Modern FTAs try to correct for this home bias, but the quantitative impact of 
these measures is hardly known. 
34 It originates from Tinbergen (1962), among others. 
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often at the level of aggregated goods trade, although recent papers also discuss aggregated 
services trade. Apart from GDP of both countries and the distance, researchers include many 
potential trade barriers in these models and test their relevance for trade. By applying the 
policy analysis on the estimated models, the trade effects of FTAs are simulated and sometimes 
followed by GDP effects based on the relationship between trade and GDP. Although the 
gravity equation has a firm theoretical background,35 this methodology does not include 
interactions between sectors and markets, hence no general equilibrium, thereby missing out 
on significant welfare effects. Although gravity equations can be estimated at the level of 
economic sectors, most studies estimate the models for aggregate goods trade flows. Trade in 
services is usually ignored.  
For goods trade, the gravity model has been thoroughly tested empirically. The explanatory 
power of the model is large compared to many other econometric models, but there is always 
the question of whether the model includes all the relevant variables. The part of trade that is 
not explained is often associated with trade barriers. If the model misses important 
explanatory variables, the impact of those variables is erroneously associated with (higher) 
non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers are often sector-specific and higher in services due to 
regulation, which is ignored in this macro approach.  
As a second step, the trade effects of trade liberalisation are translated into welfare or income 
effects. The effects of liberalisation in gravity models are much larger than those in CGE 
models, because the estimated link between economic openness and GDP incorporates 
implicitly all dynamic linkages, related productivity improvements and knowledge spill-
overs.36  
Nowadays many papers also use gravity equations for explaining bilateral FDI (flows or 
stocks). Although the explanatory power of gravity equations is somewhat smaller for FDI 
than for trade, this econometric model performs well. GDP in the home and host country and 
distance are the main explanatory variables. This application is often derived from the trade 
literature but also from theoretical frameworks describing the determinants of FDI.  
Alternative modelling options have their weaknesses too. The econometric methods used for 
gravity equations and for growth-openness equations seem to be very attractive. At least these 
estimates include all dynamic effects of productivity improvements and knowledge diffusion. 
However, the link between trade policy proposals and economic openness is much weaker 
than in CGE models. Moreover, these models do not include services trade (at least not in the 
first stage). Although these models do very well in illustrating the long-term effect of openness 
on GDP, it is much harder to analyse concrete policy proposals, if only because they rarely 
have a sectoral specification, and if so, only in a very aggregate way. In fact, gravity models 
are best for obtaining an overall ‘ballpark’ figure (say, GDP and overall trade flows) for major 
changes in trade, not for details. Another disadvantage is that these models do not have 
general equilibrium spill-overs towards the capital market, for example. 
                                                   
35 Anderson & van Wincoop (2003). 
36 Recently, Arkolakis et al. (2012) use another approach that is expanded by Felbermayr et al. (2013). 
Using a very simple model, which requires only information on import shares and the substitution 
elasticity between different varieties of a good, they estimate the welfare gains of trade. These gains are 
modest, but in their conclusions Arkolakis et al. (2012) state that many dynamic mechanisms are missing 
in their model. The model expansion of Felbermayr et al. (2013) enlarges the welfare gains of trade 
liberalisation significantly.  
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2. Stylising TTIP for the IA: Assumptions and simplifications? 
This chapter discusses how the different parts of a trade agreement are analysed in the 
economic analysis. We explain, in particular for TTIP, how the main assumptions have been 
modelled and how they influence the impact assessments. After a general introduction, the 
section mainly focuses on quantification of NTBs and spill-over effects. 
2.1 Stylising the TTIP negotiations for economic analysis 
Modern bilateral or regional trade agreements, let alone comprehensive economic 
partnerships (also including investment and a host of other domains), are so encompassing 
and comprise so many policy issues that it is not possible to obtain an overall economic 
overview for MEPs and others by attempting to scrutinise each and every detail. In any event, 
at the outset not all such details are known in the first place. The purpose of early economic 
assessments, prior to negotiations and/or, in any case, prior to agreeing substantive results, is 
to acquire an overall perspective on the aggregate economic effects as well as a credible but 
merely approximate notion of sectoral and specific horizontal economic effects. It should be 
realised that such empirical economic analysis is already a tall order and a rather demanding 
exercise. Because of this broad, almost panoramic perspective, partial equilibrium approaches 
– with which all economists are familiar – would never do. The choice is between variations 
of CGE models, macroeconometric models, gravity-based approaches and highly 
stylised/simplified, aggregate trade models with basic simulation. However, the more 
demanding the assignment, e.g. in sectoral details, whilst also retaining the overall economic 
impact based on ally interactions between markets, the less likely it is that the latter simplified 
approaches would be able to deliver.  
A prerequisite for such early overall economic assessment is a stylised presentation of the 
expected agreement. In Table 1, the negotiation structure of TTIP as agreed in February 2013 
by the HLWG provides a good first lead of what is likely to be the substance of the eventual 
agreement, hence, what would have to be assessed in terms of expected economic effects. 
In trying to appreciate any quantitative economic assessment of TTIP, the first caveat is found 
already here, before any technical details have been discussed yet. Table 1 immediately makes 
clear that not all domains specified by the HLWG are susceptible to (quantitative) economic 
analysis. Thus, in the second column on regulatory issues, neither the “cross-cutting 
disciplines on regulatory coherence and transparency” nor the “framework on future 
cooperation” can be quantified ex-ante, and possibly not even ex post without heroic 
assumptions. However, this does not mean that achievements in these domains are not 
important economically. It is always an option to insert an arbitrary degree of lowering market 
access costs due to accomplishments in such areas, but this would be purely speculative, most 
of all on the future framework. In the third column, the problems for the economic analyst are 
even greater. In a few cases, e.g. customs and facilitation, a ‘guesstimate’ of the bilateral 
potential of cost reduction might be made with the help of experts – and this has become a 
significant question for customs facilitation due to the expensive 100% container scanning 
regulation that the US plans to introduce in 2014. But for the most part, it is out of the question 
that one can quantify the impact of transatlantic rule-making for the rest of the world economy, 
which depends in any event on the willingness of others to follow suit.  
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Table 1. Negotiation structure of TTIP 
Market access Regulatory issues, NTBs Rules, globally relevant 
Tariffs SPS-plus IPRs 
Services  TBT-plus Environment and labour 
Investment (Cross-cutting disciplines on) 
regulatory coherence and 
transparency 
‘Other globally relevant challenges and 
opportunities’, strengthen rules-based 
multilateralism 
Public 
procurement 
Sectoral commitments Rules, principles or modes of 
cooperation in:  
 customs & facilitation 
 competition policy; state-owned  
 enterprises  
 local barriers to trade  
 raw materials & energy 
 SMEs  
 transparency 
 Framework for future cooperation  
Source: US-EU HLWG (2013). 
Of course, one might argue – as CEPR (2013a) briefly refers to and which we shall inspect in 
greater detail in section 2.III – that the huge weight of EU-US economic intercourse creates a 
strong incentive for third countries to align rule-making and/or standards, given that they 
have to comply in exchanges with the EU and the US anyway. Moreover, some important 
neighbouring economies (Canada, Mexico, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland, for example) 
have a much greater incentive to follow, which, in turn, strengthens the incentives of others to 
join in too. But in the final analysis, these incentives and their ‘effects’ (so-called ‘positive spill-
overs’ of TTIP to third countries) are not measurable beforehand and one can, at best, make 
only an intelligent ‘guess’ once one understands better the determinants of the follow-up 
decisions in third countries. In Table 1, column 3, it is equally challenging to analyse, 
quantitatively and beforehand, impacts on SMEs and transparency, for example.  
However, even in the first column of the table one finds problematic areas for economic 
research. Opening up of public procurement is notoriously difficult to tackle with empirical 
economic analysis and in particular in CGE models, as employed by CEPR (2013a) and others 
(see also chapter 4). To a lesser degree, this is true for (direct) investment. 
2.2 How non-tariffs measures (NTMs) have been quantified  
The Ecorys (2009a) study, on which CEPR (2013a) is partially based, is a follow-up of the 2007 
EU-US agreement on a Transatlantic Economic Council and a new Transatlantic Economic 
Framework. Table 2 presents, in summary terms, how the Ecorys and CEPR reports have 
stylised the eventual EU-US agreement.  
Even casual observation shows that these two studies, although technically and in terms of 
inputs are closely related, do not fully overlap in terms of substance of (better) market access, 
and both also differ from Table 1 At the same time, the economic impact of an eventual TTIP 
agreement will overwhelmingly be based on the areas that have been covered. Readers thus 
have to study carefully what exactly has been assessed in empirical economic analysis and what 
has not.  
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Table 2. Stylised TTIP-like expected agreements studied by CEPR and Ecorys 
CEPR (2013a)  Ecorys (2009) 
Tariffs No tariffs: focus is on NTMs in trade and 
investment  
NTBs reduction on goods and services: since 
this is done with sectoral tariff equivalents, it 
amounts to covering TBT-plus in TTIP, SPS-plus 
and sectoral commitments in TTIP, all assumed 
to benefit from average reductions (of 10%, 25%, 
etc.) 
NTMs reduction with different degrees 
dependent on actionability. The NTMs 
identified and assessed in detail for 12 goods 
and services sectors, and with less detail in 10 
more sectors, plus cross-cutting NTMs; besides, 
100% container scanning (US) is assessed 
separately 
Investment; however, note that the analysis is 
not merely about barrier removal (called NTBs, 
too) but also about the impact on investment 
(and FDI income) from NTB removal in goods 
and services 
Investment NTMs are included in the sectoral 
analyses (except one) 
Public procurement Public procurement, impact macro as well as for 
20 sectors 
Regulatory spill-overs to third countries (both 
direct and indirect); one can interpret that as 
reflecting (in Error! Reference source not found. 
on TTIP) most of the third column as well as 
regulatory coherence (second column), plus the 
free benefits of third countries, i.e. better or less 
costly market access to the EU-US markets due 
to (non-discriminatory) lower restrictiveness; 
however, the authors simply assume an 
arbitrary degree of spill-over 
IPRs, macro effects as well as for 20 sectors 
Note: NTMs are all non-price and non-quantity-based restrictions of trade in goods and services and of 
investment. The practical difference with NTBs is minor, once quotas and price controls (a rarity in EU-US 
trade relations) are ignored. 
For a long time, NTBs or NTMs were ignored in trade analysis.37 After 1970, they began to 
attract the attention of economists – in describing and classifying them for purposes of 
negotiation and understanding of policies – but it has only been in the last six or seven years 
that empirical measurements of NTMs were undertaken on a regular scale. Therefore, it is 
good to appreciate that Ecorys (2009a) was faced with a novel area of empirical economic 
research with formidable problems to overcome. Moreover, the ambition of the exercise – 
obtaining reasonably credible estimates of NTMs between the US and the EU over a wide 
spectrum of goods and services – was again unique at that point in time.  
For practical purposes, NTMs between the US and the EU are ‘regulatory barriers’ of one kind 
or another. In other words, when considering exporting, firm X need not only take into account 
i) transport, insurance and freight (if goods), ii) customs procedures (if goods), iii) tariffs (if 
                                                   
37 According to the UNCTAD definition, non-tariff measures (NTMs) are policy measures other than 
ordinary customs tariffs that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, 
changing quantities traded, or prices or both (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2009/3). Non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) refer to restrictions that result from prohibitions, conditions or specific market requirements that 
make importation or exportation of products difficult and/or costly. NTBs also include unjustified 
and/or improper application of NTMs, such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and other 
technical barriers to trade (TBT). 
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goods) and iv) inland distribution costs, but also the costs of NTMs. Such NTM costs tend to 
have a discouraging effect on trade, as they are bound to raise the price when reaching the 
final consumer or the industrial user in the value chain. (By the way, how much the price is 
raised – by the full amount of the costs of the NTM or less – is yet another complication that 
we shall ignore, to keep matters simple.)  
Before going into how one may arrive at a proxy for the costs of NTMs over the North Atlantic, 
it is useful to examine the nature of NTMs. Regulatory barriers find their roots in domestic 
regulation, which we typically denote as ‘SHEIC regulation’: regulation (and all that it takes 
to ensure that companies conform to it) to reduce or minimise the risks with respect to Safety, 
Health, Environment, Investors (and savers), and Consumer protection. These five areas are 
those of the classic ‘market failures’ that can justify domestic regulation. The normal routine 
should be – and often is, although not always – that an independent, scientific assessment 
determines the risk(s) of a good or service in terms of one or more of the objectives under 
SHEIC. Both the EU and the US have a system to assess whether and to what extent such risks 
have to be contained, reduced or minimised via policies. Although sometimes targeted taxes 
or subsidies are used for purposes of overcoming such market failures, in the overwhelming 
majority of instances, it is domestic regulation that is employed to reduce risks to levels that 
society (ultimately, the legislator) accepts as tolerable. Zero risk is almost never possible; even 
if it were in some cases, the (marginal) costs would probably make it unaffordable or indeed 
absurdly costly. Such SHEIC regulation inevitably has a cost domestically, and ‘good 
regulation’ should ensure that regulation is designed in such a way as to have the benefits to 
society (reducing risk to a tolerable level) outweigh the cost by a considerable margin. This 
should be done on the basis of a sound and rigorous regulatory impact assessment. Once one 
exports to that country, obviously one has to comply with that regulation, just like domestic 
producers or suppliers do.  
Let us simplify and assume that a US regulation (aimed at health and safety) for good X adds 
25% of extra costs to the price of that good. An EU exporter should be expected to pay those 
extra costs as well. One might be led to believe that the EU exporter faces a US NTM of 25%. 
This may or may not be correct. It would be correct only if i) the US imposes regulatory 
requirements that are not imposed at all in the EU (but this is rare, although not entirely 
impossible) or ii) the EU and the US both have a regulation for good X but what is required 
for the EU domestically is of no relevance for compliance in the US. (This is rare in such an 
extreme formulation, but less rare for parts of the requirements, which may differ to some 
degree). This shows immediately that, in the large majority of cases, NTMs cannot be read 
from the domestic costs of regulation. However, even the domestic costs of regulation are not 
all that easy to determine, as they are available neither in statistics nor in a regulator inventory. 
Most of the time, the EU is likely to have somewhat similar SHEIC objectives, i.e. risk reduction 
to tolerable levels, to those of the US and hence companies producing good X have normally 
incurred costs in order to design and produce a compliant product. In this routine case, NTMs 
may take two forms. One is that the US authorities apply fairly similar rules based on similar 
objectives but still subject good X to conformity assessment, without taking the prior EU 
conformity into account. The NTM would then be equal to those extra costs. And TTIP could 
negotiate that the EU and the US would explicitly take into account what the other’s 
conformity assessment has done before (and make rules to ensure that these assessments are 
comparable). If the rules on both sides are seen as ‘equivalent’ (for the purpose of similar 
SHEIC objectives), the NTM can fall to near zero due to recognition. The other NTM form 
consists of somewhat different rules (or, at times, even a distinct logic or system) even though 
the objectives are similar, and then compliance adjustments will have to be made in production 
prior to conformity assessment. In some cases, this is easy, and in other cases, this can be 
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expensive. The NTM would then be the extra compliance costs of adjustment (or the unit costs 
of having a separate line of production especially for compliant exports to the US), plus the 
conformity assessment in the US. It goes without saying that the latter type of NTMs might be 
expected to be rather high.  
All this shows that even a simple exposition of NTMs can quickly become complicated and 
finding out the proper (costs of) NTMs is far from easy. Moreover, we have ignored other costs 
such as getting-to-know rules, procedures and agencies ‘on the other side’ (think of SMEs 
trying out their first exports), waiting time (so-called ‘time-to-market’) due to certification or 
testing, which is highly sensitive in fast-moving markets, and other aspects leading to 
additional costs of getting the good or service to the (US or EU) market (including liability 
insurance premiums, which tend to be much higher in the US than in the EU). On the other 
hand, transatlantic trade (to some extent, in services, too) is often part and parcel of wider 
value-chains, and this might actually reduce transaction costs due to technical specifications 
(and access to testing, etc.) ‘on the other side’. Moreover, some one-third of transatlantic goods 
trade is thought to be intra-firm trade where such NTMs might be lower in actual practice, for 
the same reasons, only a fortiori, e.g. think of components made in the EU according to US 
specifications already agreed by authorities.  
After all these (simplified) preliminaries, it is possible to try to understand and assess how 
Ecorys has estimated NTMs in EU-US trade in goods and services. In order to render their 
exercise intelligible to laymen, we refer to a flowchart (see Figure 1) of all the steps Ecorys has 
gone through (see below). Irrespective of our critical remarks and the weaknesses observed, it 
is a major effort with several sources and that will be difficult to repeat without another large 
and expensive transatlantic research project. However, some weaknesses are built into the 
entire approach and they need to be highlighted first.  
First, one gross simplification is that the method will yield only one single NTM per sector for 
20 goods and services sectors. However, the 20 sectors range in size from large to very large. 
In other words, NTMs are averaged for the entire sector, even though there may well be many 
different goods or services, not to speak of differentiated goods and services (somewhat 
similar goods but to a degree substitutable depending, e.g. on quality and relative prices). 
Thus ‘the’ chemical sector and ‘the’ car sector have one single NTM. In actual practice, NTMs 
will differ and this might matter for export patterns. Also, the subsequent price responses may 
therefore differ in the market of destination. The principal reason for opting for a single NTM 
per sector is that the CGE–GTAP model, in which the NTMs are simulated to be reduced due 
to TTIP, only allow for aggregated sectors with a single price. This is understandable given the 
many sectors (here 20), and the many countries and regions explicitly included in the model.38  
Secondly, another fundamental difficulty is in services. Between the US and the EU, services 
exchange is likely to be concentrated in mode 3, given the distance, and for ‘well-tradable 
services’ (only a few sectors) in mode 1. This creates an extra difficulty of mixing two very 
different NTMs, one for services trade and one for services supplied locally ‘on the other side’ 
via subsidiaries. In some cases, there might even be a substitution between these two modes. 
Third, Ecorys bundles two barriers into one: NTMs in a narrow sense (as explained above) and 
what is called ‘regulatory heterogeneity’ (‘regulatory divergence’ in Ecorys). The latter 
overlaps with the idea of NTMs, but it is very hard to say exactly how much. The distinction 
has immediate implications for how the NTMs are modelled in terms of costs. Thus, if 
                                                   
38 Thus, on p. 200 of Annex III  of the Ecorys study (www.ntb.ecorys.com), the authors note that, with 
40 countries’ pairs of bilateral trade flows with 14 sectoral NTMs over a 10-year period during which 
the adjustment to a TTIP agreement takes place in the economy, one obtains 224,000 observations! 
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objectives are ‘equivalent’, mere heterogeneity (thereby no NTM barrier as such, only different 
rules) would express the fixed costs – to be incurred only once – of getting into the (US or EU) 
market with (say) a product derived from chemicals. On the other hand, NTMs would suggest 
the addition of a cost every time one exports (a mark-up over marginal costs). Ecorys does not 
discuss this economic distinction at all. This implies that regulatory heterogeneity is modelled 
by (extra) marginal costs and is therefore not distinct from NTMs. Clearly, even when initial 
entry costs created by regulatory heterogeneity are high, once turnover in the export market 
grows, the initial entry costs are seen as fixed costs once-and-for-all and written off, and 
variable costs will not be affected. NTMs, on the other hand, would always add to export costs. 
Therefore, if the US or the EU would not impose continuous and repetitive tests (hence the 
extra marginal costs, which would remain roughly constant over time) but only one-time 
‘entry costs’, it is critical to identify the remaining NTMs. If the remaining NTMs are repeated 
mark-ups over marginal costs, continuous inspection/approval costs, or extra costs for a 
different design for each product exported to the US, the Ecorys study has the appropriate 
method for NTM identification. If, however, the adjustment to NTMs of the US concerns a 
separate production line, scale economies must matter and average NTM costs will decline 
over exported output. In such cases, the estimated NTMs would be much too high. 
Ecorys makes a point of not employing an empirical technique whereby NTMs are only 
explained by a residual after controlling for other determinants of trade.39 There is indeed a 
risk that the residual might comprise other aspects not explicitly incorporated. Using a 
stepwise procedure in order to insert NTMs directly may be better methodologically; it is 
nevertheless a complicated procedure with a large scope for mistakes or misinterpretations.  
Figure 1 describes the seven steps of the Ecorys method to identify NTMs. Step 1 and step 2 are 
of course very big hurdles: one needs sectoral expertise for both the EU and the US in many 
sectors and one requires many respondents (the researchers obtained 5,500 answers) to a very 
broad business survey in order to answer the question in step 3. Without these elaborate first 
two steps, no direct estimates of NTMs can be generated. What Ecorys acquired are ‘perceived 
NTMs’ in the form of a subjective restrictiveness indicator (from 0-100, in step 4). However, 
such restrictiveness indicators, from the perspective of business, are very different from the 
well-known PMRs of the OECD or, for that matter, the OECD’s FDI restrictiveness indicator. 
In the text of the Ecorys study, there are repeated references to the use of OECD indicators (for 
services, even a combination of their own NTM indices with OECD indices, see step 5), but this 
is puzzling. After all, the PMRs are not about SHEIC objectives but about other (so-called 
‘economic’) regulation such as entry restrictions (say, in retail) and conduct rules, price 
restrictions, monopolies, tariffs (not NTMs), etc. Moreover, the revised PMRs since 2007 are 
mainly focused on network industries, which is hardly the relevant sector group for TTIP. Step 
6 is inevitably technical: the NTM indices are multiplied bu the dummy variables40 for NAFTA, 
the EEA and TTIP; the resulting variable is inserted in the gravity equations for regression; the 
coefficients before these variables give the effect of NTMs on trade (and FDI where relevant). 
These coefficients can then be turned into the tariff equivalents (equal to percentage costs over 
the price) of NTMs, after first aggregating the three-bloc coefficients into a single NTM one 
(step 7).  
                                                   
39 This means that NTMs are not observable but derived indirectly. 
40 Dummies are binary variables used to approximate the influence of explanatory variables impossible 
to quantify. 
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Subsequently, no less than seven scenarios are suggested, but only the first two are actually 
introduced in the CGE model. These scenarios depend on the actionability of NTMs (as 
explained in the section “  
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What the EU-US impact assessment tells us and how”). The idea is that NTMs are a 
consequence of SHEIC regulation, therefore, it is not to be expected that such regulation is 
totally unjustified. Hence, it might be reformed but it will not disappear. It follows that NTMs 
cannot be compared with tariffs, which can be eliminated; NTMs cannot be removed except 
under full harmonisation together with full recognition, but they can be reduced.  
Figure 1. How Ecorys (2009) has quantified NTMs in 7 steps 
 
 
2.3 Spill-over effects 
A very interesting extension in the CEPR study on the TIPP is the spill-over effect to third 
countries, following the lowering of regulatory barriers between the US and the EU. These 
spill-over effects would not emerge if two small countries form an FTA, but this is different 
once the two largest economies in the world cooperate on regulatory issues. Direct and indirect 
spill-over effects are positive for third countries and can be modelled. Direct spill-overs 
improve the trade possibilities of third countries with the EU and US without any further 
action on the part of third countries – they are automatic. If the EU and the US streamline their 
regulatory procedures, this is subject to most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN) under the 
WTO and it also becomes easier for firms from other countries to export to the US or the EU. 
1
• Sourcing information on NTMs: sectoral literature survey (experts) and a 
business survey (5,500 respondents)
2
•Sector experts for ch.s. 5-17 (description of regulatory barriers)
•Business survey provides NTMs indices
3
•Question in survey: “…describe overall level of restrictiveness of EU (US) market 
to your export good or services”, on a scale of 0 (entirely free) to 100 (closed 
by NTMs)
4
•Obtain exporter-importer-specific “perceived NTMs” (0-100)
•Aggregated to average of all exporters of all included countries, in that 
sector, to country A
5
•Convert NTM index into log scale
•Goods: restrictiveness = ln (1+ 0.01 X index)
•Services: combined NTM indices & OECD indices
6
•Multiplying NTM indices with dummy variables for NAFTA, Atlantic (TTIP) and 
EEA; used in regressions; coefficients  effect (elasticity)
7
•From coefficients to trade costs estimates
•Aggregating the three bloc-coefficients into one single NTM per sector (for 
US/EU)
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It seems very reasonable that this effect exists in FTAs with large countries, but the authors are 
not aware of any attempt to estimate this effect.41 The 20% spill-over, conjectured in the study, 
is a kind of middle ground between irrelevance (0%) and incredibly large (50%). Indirect spill-
overs could be present as well, when third countries purposefully adopt the regulatory 
standards of the EU and US. It makes sense that firms in other countries adopt the regulatory 
standards of large countries, when the former are closely linked to the EU, the US or both. This 
would also improve market opportunities for American and European firms in these third 
countries. In CEPR, these indirect spillovers are half as many as direct spillovers , thus 10% of 
the original decrease in NTBs, but empirical material on indirect spill-overs is missing – it is a 
mere conjecture – thus one better be prudent in order not to overestimate the effect. In practice, 
the size of the spill-overs is probably sector specific, but data needed to estimate these effects 
are missing. 
Of course, the greater the spill-overs to third countries, the more TTIP outcomes begin to look 
like multilateral or plurilateral – rather than bilateral – results benefiting all. This important 
significance is further enhanced by the consequence that TTIP itself would also see its gains 
increase due to such spill-overs.  
Therefore, it is desirable to acquire some understanding of the determinants of TTIP spill-overs 
to third countries. Institutionally, TTIP spill-overs can be acquired via three mechanisms. First 
and easiest, positive spill-overs can be ‘direct’. This would happen merely due to MFN 
obligations in the WTO. Due to MFN, third countries can sometimes be ‘free riders’. This 
would be so if TTIP would incorporate MFN-based forms of ‘harmonisation’ or straight 
regulatory market access liberalisation, e.g. by dropping certain requirements. These cases are 
likely to be rare but not at all impossible. Second, indirect spill-overs or, to make it more clear, 
‘policy-induced spill-overs’ occur when agreed harmonisation or mutual recognition in TTIP 
(perhaps with a minimum of regulation, say, of objectives only) would also be adopted by 
third countries. This (domestic) act of re-regulation by third countries will of course have to 
be incentivised, otherwise, it will not, or in any case will not easily, happen. One can stretch 
this to standards, be they common US-EU standards, or, more likely, world standards, or 
declarations of some legal validity that (these) US and EU standards (though somewhat 
different) are ‘equivalent’, or, in the case of compatibility or interoperability standards, that 
they need to be identical. This second mechanism may not require any explicit act between the 
TTIP partners and a third country, or presumably no more than an informal agreement.  
The third mechanism consists of an explicit attempt by TTIP partners (via a call on others to 
join such attempts) or by third countries to negotiate the equivalence of rules based on TTIP 
results. Given the complexity of some regulatory regimes, this would not be surprising. 
However, the outcome of such efforts is presumably less certain; once agreed, the spill-overs 
are similar in nature.  
The second mechanism would only be set into motion once there are sufficient incentives; 
activating the third mechanism would require even greater incentives. The most obvious and 
most important incentive is found in mutual trade relations. The EU and US are still quite 
                                                   
41 While spill-over effects are foreseen to be positive for mature or emerging economies that orbit around 
the two signatories, there is an increasing concern that the possibility of setting a regional regulatory 
framework involving, for instance, common standards or a harmonisation process could increase intra-
regional exchange of goods and services by excluding developing economies that are not able to comply 
with the agreed level (Mattoo, 2013). It is worth noticing, however, that before knowing what the 
negotiating chapters will be, evaluating spill-over effects on different sets of countries is a rather 
speculative exercise. This is probably why it is not very clear how the estimated spill-over effects have 
been calculated in CEPR (2013a). 
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important in world trade, though much less than a few decades ago. The following simple 
exercise shows that spill-overs – quite apart from their specific regulatory substance – are 
incentivised far more in NAFTA and in Europe with the EU’s closest economic neighbours 
(Switzerland, Norway and Turkey) than in a second group of the seven largest traders in the 
world (not counting TTIP and ignoring Russia, as it does not export manufactured goods in 
large volumes). Precisely with Turkey, Switzerland and Norway the EU already has credible 
channels for regulatory convergence and a lot of harmonisation and standardisation has 
already taken place in the past. In NAFTA regulatory convergence used to be no more than 
marginal but both Mexico and Canada now have Regulatory Councils with the US.  
Table 3 below shows that ‘the Five’ leading exporters (Canada, Mexico, Turkey, Switzerland, 
Norway) have export shares for TTIP (in their world exports) ranging from 43% to 86%, 
whereas ‘the Seven’ top exporters (‘the Five’ plus Brazil and China) merely score TTIP shares 
of between 17% and 34%. One may wonder whether these lower shares would give enough 
incentive to initiate a process of domestic re-regulation.  
One might, however, consider the possibility of ‘domino effects’. Thus, once ‘the Five’ would 
have adopted TTIP rules, third countries might reconsider if they have a much higher export 
share to TTIP plus ‘the Five’. Table 3 shows, however, that such domino effects are at best very 
weak – the exports of ‘the Seven’ to TTIP plus ‘the Five’ are hardly larger.   
There may well be other reasons to align with TTIP norms and rules. However, insofar as this 
simple exercise would reflect a proxy for incentives to engineer (indirect) spill-overs, one is 
led to conclude that i) ‘the Five’ trading partners, already very important to the EU, resp. the 
US, and locked into rather ‘deep’ agreements, are the countries for which one would expect 
spill-overs to be interesting, ii) this is far less the case for the seven largest trading countries 
(of industrial goods) outside TTIP and iii) it is unlikely that a domino effect will emerge, at 
least on this basis. 
Table 3. Exports of total products ($ billions), 2012 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013). 
 
To US EU27 World
(EU+US)
/World 
(%)
Exports from
Canada 337.83 38.50 453.38 83%
Mexico 288.15 22.13 370.83 84%
Turkey 5.61 60.24 152.54 43%
Switzerland 25.12 125.93 225.95 67%
Norway 8.09 130.74 161.00 86%
Brazil 26.85 48.89 242.58 31%
China 352.44 334.27 2,048.78 34%
India 37.17 48.53 289.56 30%
Indonesia 14.91 18.05 190.03 17%
Japan 142.04 81.47 798.57 28%
 Korea, Rep 58.81 49.63 547.85 20%
South Africa 6.51 17.41 86.71 28%
Nafta
EEA + 
Custom 
Union
Rest of the 
World
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Table 4. Exports of total products ($ billions), 2012 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013). 
3. Comparison with other free trade agreements and their underlying 
modelling42 
The purpose of the present chapter is to compare the CEPR (2013a) approach to an EU-US 
trade agreement (here, TTIP) with other recent studies on ‘deep’ bilateral trade agreements. 
Chapter 1 has already pointed out that the Commission’s IA on EU-US trade relations can only 
be compared to the EU-Japan IA. This is indeed the second time (excluding the investment 
agreement with China) that the Commission has proposed an IA to request the mandate to 
start the negotiations (differently from TSIAs, which are usually performed during the 
negotiations). As already mentioned, the two IAs (EU-US and EU-Japan) follow similar 
structures and are coherent with the IA Guidelines. 
Besides that, other free trade agreements comparable to TTIP (especially CETA) have been 
assessed through economic modelling to evaluate the possibility of starting the negotiations. 
In this respect, this chapter will compare the economic modelling behind other FTAs by 
focusing on four elements: methodologies, data sets, how studies deal with NTMs (NTBs) and 
the respective stylised scenarios. The comparison should help readers to appreciate a range of 
factors and/or assumptions that might cause methodology behind IAs of trade agreements to 
differ. We compare the TTIP study with recent economic studies, similarly based on the 
quantification of NTBs that supported the start of EU-Japan and CETA negotiations. Due to 
its importance,43 we also include a box on the EU-South Korea Agreement. 
                                                   
42 It is worth emphasising that the aim of this chapter is to compare the economic methodology behind 
the background studies that preceded the start of the negotiations of comparable free trade agreements. 
Some of them, however, like CETA, have not been subject to a Commission IA. We thought it was 
meaningful to compare them anyway given the similarities on the trade pattern and potential spill-over 
effects that could take place.  
43 We refer to the EU-Korea FTA because it is the first agreement reached after the Lisbon Treaty and 
one of the first templates of a new generation of deep and comprehensive FTAs. 
 Canada Mexico Norway Switzerland Turkey
Exports to
Brazil 3.08 4.00 0.87 1.71 1.21 242.58 3% 2%
China 28.13 27.52 3.02 3.51 15.59 2,048.78 3% 1%
 India 2.01 1.60 0.24 1.17 3.67 289.56 1% 2%
 Indonesia 0.79 0.65 0.09 0.06 1.37 190.03 1% 1%
Japan 10.26 10.48 1.23 4.38 2.41 798.57 3% 1%
Korea, Rep 4.83 9.04 1.06 0.41 4.55 547.85 3% 1%
S. Africa 0.45 0.37 0.29 1.11 0.74 86.71 1% 2%
EEA+CU
/World 
(%)
NAFTA EEA+ CU
World
NAFTA
/World 
(%)
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3.1 EU-US vs. comparable agreements: Is the economic modelling 
consistent? 
FTAs’ analyses comparable to those on TTIP such as EU-Japan and EU-Canada differ in 
market structure.44 Analysing further where the differences in market structure occur,45 one 
observes that the EU-US and the Japan IAs have quite a similar approach, differing only in the 
“automotive” (or “motor vehicles”) sector. Nevertheless, the subset of transport equipment 
defined as “automotive products” (Standard International Trade Classification [STIC] product 
grouping) is far from being a negligible one. In 2012, it represented 13.7% of EU exports to 
Japan (equal to €7.6 bn) and 15.3% of EU imports from Japan (€9.74 bn); 11.3% of EU exports 
to US (€33.15 bn) and 3.5% of EU imports from US (€7.14 bn); 12.3% of EU exports to Canada 
(€3.84 bn) and 1.1% of EU imports from Canada (€342 mn).46 Such differences in modelling 
assumption could eventually lead to discrepancies in final estimations, i.e. having possible 
repercussions on trade (import-export) impact, welfare, wages and output (composition and 
change) evaluation. 
 
The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
Two studies – both commissioned by the European Commission (DG Trade) – produced an 
assessment regarding the economic impact(s) of an EU-Korea FTA. Copenhagen Economics (CE) 
published its final report in August 2006, whereas four years later, in May 2010, the CEPII/ATLASS 
report was made available to the general public. Both reports made use of the CGE modelling 
techniques in order to provide estimations for benefits and costs of this specific trade policy. 
Nevertheless, similarities (almost) end there. To avoid confusion, the reports will be analysed 
separately, i.e. first the CE report, second the CEPII/ATLAS, and a final comparison of results will 
be provided below. 
The 2006 CE report uses the GTAP database, in its 6.2 version (2001 data). It acknowledges the very 
active FTA policy conducted by Korea, and therefore takes into account the other seven ‘Korea-
centred’ FTAs, i.e. US, Canada, China, India, Japan, ASEAN, and EFTA, assuming Korea to enter 
these FTAs simultaneously, with the following features: a limited liberalisation in agriculture, an 
intermediate one in services (-25% of barriers to trade services), and a full liberalisation in 
manufacturing. 
                                                   
44 The GTAP community acknowledges the importance market structure (inter alia, monopoly, duopoly, 
oligopoly, perfect competition) has for theoretical models, their consequent computations, and their 
final estimations (Konan & Van Assche, 2004). 
45 Two major modelling options are available at the time of writing this report (indeed, it is possible to 
assume the structure of the sector to be ‘Armingtonian’ or subject to ‘monopolistic competition’, for 
further explanation about the meanings, see Annex II). As there is not a unique rule defining which of 
the two approaches is the best for each sector, conceptualisation of market structures among different 
IAs may vary, depending on the underlying assumptions researchers decide to make. A summary for 
market structures used in the EU-US, EU-Japan and EU-Canada IAs is provided in Annex II. 
46 EU-US: DG Trade statistics on EU-US trade (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ 
september/tradoc_113465.pdf). 
EU-Japan: DG Trade statistics on EU-Japan trade (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ 
september/tradoc_113403.pdf). 
EU-Canada: DG Trade statistics on EU-Canada trade 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113363.pdf). 
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CE designed three scenarios to be implemented through CGE modelling: two ‘partial’ agreements, 
both including 40% tariff reductions in food and full bilateral tariff reductions in non-food, but 
differing in barriers to service trade, with the first foreseeing a reduction of 25%, the second of 50%; 
and one ‘full’ FTA, where food, non-food and services are fully liberalised. 
CE calculated the costs of NTMs using industry-specific gravity equations, and took services as a 
single sector. CE found a real income increase of up to 2.4% for South Korea and barely beyond zero 
(but positive) for the EU. 
The 2010 CEPII/ATLASS report uses MIRAGE to elaborate the calculations of CGE modelling. It 
elaborated two baselines: the first foresees no Doha agreement, includes only those FTAs already in 
force and assumes a possible increase (equal to 50%) in Korean protection in the services sector. The 
second includes an agreement in Doha (concerning services and trade facilitation) and FTAs under 
negotiation, i.e. Korea-USA, Korea-Canada, EU-India, EU-Singapore, and EU-Canada. In addition, it 
considers a possible increase (equal to 25%) in Korean protection in the services sector. CEPII/ATLASS 
elaborated one scenario only, on the basis of the official contents of the agreement, both for tariffs and 
NTBs.47    
CEPII/ATLASS utilised a mixed methodology for NTBs calculations, similar to the one of the CE 
report, which gave relatively high results, later scaled down in order to be adapted to reality.  
The table below shows a summary of the estimations provided by the two studies. Looking at the 
differences (sometimes not trivial, changing from a negative to a positive effect, or the opposite, e.g. 
EU chemicals, metals or consumer electronics, in the final effects between the CE and the 
CEPII/ATLASS report, it seems that assumptions, methodology to calculate the NTBs and/or the 
scenarios modelled play a crucial role in determining the final results.   
                                                   
47 Note on the Table 5: Korea-US: Tariff: 95% of liberalisation in three years and the rest in 10 years. 
Around 2% is excluded (agriculture); services: binding of actual openness (similar to EU but without 
additional liberalisation in three sectors); Korea with Canada: 95% cut for goods. Other FTAs with the 
EU: same bilateral tariff cuts as for the EU-Korea agreement. The scenario comprehends tariffs cuts “as 
scheduled” and the following NTBs cuts: 60% cut at t=0 (Korea, out of which 10% at MFN basis); another 
20% cut at t=5 (Korea) in the automotive sector; 80% cut over five years (Korea) in the consumer 
electronics sector; 50% cut at t=0 (Korea, MFN basis) in pharmaceuticals; and a 20% cut (EU and Korea) 
for all other industries. In addition, it includes 10% cuts in services NTBs at t=2 (Korea) for the telecom 
and financial sectors; 10% cut at t=10 (Korea) for business services; whereas all other services sectors are 
left unchanged. 
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Table 5. EU-South Korea FTA: Main findings 
 
Note: See Footnote 48. 
Source: CEPII/ATLASS (2010). 
 
3.2 Dataset and economic results 
CGE models are based on a complex and comprehensive database, which is periodically 
revised and updated. Thus, different versions might contain different data (in cases of 
identification and correction of inconsistencies this might be true even for the same value), or 
simply could refer to different years, used as a baseline in the model. In fact, these databases 
are ‘pictures’ of the economy in different periods of time. As an example, the last version of 
GTAP – known as GTAP 8 – includes for the first time a ‘dual reference’ to 2004 and 2007, 
whereas its previous version (GTAP 7) portrays the global economy in 2004 only (GTAP, 2014).  
In order to estimate future gains and losses through the use of a CGE model, economists have 
to build a ‘baseline scenario’, which – as in every EU impact assessment – should depict “how 
the current situation would evolve without additional public intervention” (EC, Guidelines IA 
2009, p. 24). The CGE framework describes this ‘baseline scenario’ at some point in future, in 
order to be able to include all the effects of the specific trade deal.48 Thus, as it is a ‘future’ 
                                                   
48 Using these data as a fundamental reference, the modellers create a “baseline scenario” at some point 
in future, reasonably far enough in time to be able to capture all static and dynamic effects (Copenhagen 
Economics, 2009). Static (or short-run) effects correspond to the “immediate” impacts of trade 
liberalisation, i.e. consequences in the year of reference, e.g. 2025, when the agreement is “fully 
introduced and implemented”. Dynamic (or medium-long-run) effects provide an estimation of the 
impacts in the year of reference, e.g. 2025, of the agreement as if it would have been already applied for 
a substantial amount of time, e.g. 2018, in order to fully assess investment effects. In other words, static 
effects correspond to the gains linked to a more efficient allocation of productive factors, i.e. labour and 
capital, due to the economic agreement. Dynamic effects also take into account that trade and 
investment liberalisation affects the returns to productive factors, i.e. labour, meaning wages, and 
capital). These variations are very likely to affect the supply of these productive factors, and 
consequently the overall productive capacity of the economy under analysis. 
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scenario, the baseline (and consequently all the other scenarios that are calculated as the 
difference with the baseline) is not built on ex post data collection but on forecasts. These 
(macro) economic projections are assembled on the basis of past datasets, e.g. in the case of 
GTAP 8 the dataset contains information on 2004 and 2007, and some assumptions, inter alia, 
the economic growth rate. 
As a consequence, changing assumptions on (for example) growth rates might influence the 
‘baseline scenario’, change which, in turn, might affect the other scenarios and therefore the 
final estimates. 
Again, the research team decided to gather information on macroeconomic projections used 
to benchmark models to their ‘baseline year’, regarding the three agreements concerned above 
(EU-US, EU-Japan and EU-Canada). Details on differences are available in Annex II.Error! 
Reference source not found. 
 
Unfortunately, the comparative exercise runs into limitations, mainly due to different 
projection periods and limited availability of data in the case of the EU-Japan study. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to focus on the EU, the only geographical area that remains 
coherent across the three documents. In fact, annualised GDP growth for the EU assumed in 
the EU-Canada agreement (+2.55%, 2007-2014) turns out to be more than three times higher 
than the more conservative one reported in the EU-US agreement (+0.70%, 2007-2016).49  
3.3 NTMs: Theory and indicators construction 
NTMs50 are all but negligible in international trade, especially when referring to trade among 
developed countries. Thus any assessment related to the hypothetical effects of a trade 
agreement between the EU-US, EU-Japan or EU-Canada should incorporate them in its 
analysis, and in fact they do. Nevertheless, CGE modelling offers alternative approaches to 
include NTMs, and the three studies address the question of calculating tariff equivalents (or 
ad valorem equivalent) using different techniques. 
Figure 2 provides a schematic appraisal of the alternative methods used in assessing the cost 
impact of NTMs. 
                                                   
49 Even if the time span is not perfectly comparable the two periods are similar (2007-2014 and 2007-
2016), and it is difficult to hypothesise that huge differences could come from the period 2014-2016. The 
opposite being true, economic modelling – ceteris paribus – hardly foresees huge variations during future 
periods. 
50 In this section NTMs and NTBs will be used as synonyms (even if some discrepancies emerged in the 
literature), maintaining a neutral approach and leaving aside implied judgments on their legitimacy. 
See chapter 2. 
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Figure 2. Trade cost reduction estimations: Differences in approaches 
 
Note: TCEs = Tariff cost equivalent, referred as ‘NTMs tariff equivalent’ elsewhere. 
1 Regional Economic Integration Agreements.  
2 Francois et al. (2007), “Does Gravity Apply to Non-Tangibles: Gravity Estimates of Trade and FDI Openness 
in Services”, Plenary Paper, European Trade Study Group Meeting. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on CEPR (2013a), Copenhagen Economics (2009), European Commission and 
Government of Canada (2008). 
The EU-US goods and services NTMs tariff equivalents estimations rely largely on the 2009 
Ecorys study, as explained more extensively in the earlier section entitled “Error! Reference 
source not found.”. 
On the same issue, the EU-Japan report makes explicit reference to the 2009 Ecorys study, too, 
but it forms part of a broader analytical framework. Goods and services NTMs estimations 
rely on separate methodologies. 
Goods NTMs have been determined by three different methods:  
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 Direct cost measures through a Copenhagen Economics questionnaire51 aimed at 
providing a business self-assessment, i.e. direct estimates, of the NTMs EU exporters face 
when trading with Japan. The survey covered six goods sectors in Japan, of which five 
are reported and largely described in the report, namely: “pharmaceuticals”, “medical 
devices”, “processed food”, “motor vehicles”, and “transport equipment”. 
 A standard econometric method for quantifying NTMs in the manufacturing sectors.52 
Even though the researchers account for some other factors that typically are described 
as influencing trade, e.g. GDP, distance, language, tariffs, etc., using this technique 
implies a considerable risk of overestimating higher NTMs values.53 
 The third method is similar to the previous one, only differing by the use of a directly 
quantified NTMs index. The notion of a NTMs index is based on the 2009 Ecorys survey, 
and complemented by new data obtained by Copenhagen Economics directly.54  
Table 6 reports a comparison of NTMs tariff equivalents estimates obtained using the three 
methods explained above. 
Table 6. NTMs costs (tariff equivalents) for goods, comparison by method 
 
Note: The table shows the percentage of NTMs tariff equivalents in goods. The estimates shown in bold are 
those Copenhagen Economics used in its CGHE model. “Method 1” refers to “direct cost measures”; “Method 
2” refers to gravity model with “time invariant exporter dummy” estimations; and “Method 3” refers to 
gravity model with “NTMs index” estimations. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2009). 
                                                   
51 Copenhagen Economics Questionnaire to managers of European firms that export to Japan, cited in 
Copenhagen Economics (2009). 
52 A gravity model, which does not contain NTMs measures or indexes, but simply “time invariant 
importer dummy”, i.e. a variable that aims to capture the “importer” specific effect. 
53 Incurring in higher NTM calculations (so-called ‘overestimation’) is due to the specific technique, 
which assigns to the ‘importer effect’ all sorts of other immeasurable (and non-removable in nature, at 
least through trade policy tools) factors, inter alia, a country’s culture, institutions, consumer  
preferences (CE, 2009). For more information on this econometric technique, refer to, inter alia, J.M. 
Wooldridge (2012), Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, S.W. Cengage Learning. 
54 As the 2009 Ecorys survey observations related to EU exporters in Japan were not numerous, 
Copenhagen Economics decided to ask the same question during their survey (therefore, only in the 
five sectors: pharmaceuticals, medical devices, motor vehicles, processed food and other 
manufacturing). It is worthwhile noting that NTM indices reported some discrepancies with Ecorys 
data, particularly in medical devices and processed food. In the other sectors Ecorys NTM results were 
confirmed (Copenhagen Economics, 2009). 
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Table 6 exhibits the great variability of NTMs values, depending on the calculation method 
used. In sectors where comparison is possible, variation in estimation results among different 
methods appears to be considerable (from zero variation, i.e. estimates are equal, to more than 
100%, i.e. one estimate is more than the double of the other). 
In order to estimate NTMs in services55 CE combined theoretical and empirical work.56 The 
econometric method used for services is similar to “Method 2” used for estimating NTMs tariff 
equivalents in goods. Then, the 2009 Ecorys study serves as reference for determining the 
extent to which calculated barriers to trade are ‘abatable’ (similar to ‘actionable’ in CEPR, 
2013a). Table 7 recapitulates these calculations. 
Table 7. NTMs tariff equivalents for services in EU-Japan relations 
Service Sector 
Barriers to EU 
exports to 
Japan1 
‘Abatable’ 
barriers (EU to 
Japan)2 
Barriers to Japan 
exports to EU1 
‘Abatable’ 
barriers (Japan 
to EU)2 
Finance 15.8 8.7 11.3 7.0 
Insurance 6.5 1.2 10.8 5.6 
Business and ICT 2.5 2.5 14.9 4.3 
Communications 24.7 19.2 11.7 8.2 
Construction 2.5 1.9 4.6 2.6 
Personal, cultural and 
other services 6.5 3.7 4.4 2.5 
1 The column shows percentage of NTMs tariff equivalents in services. 
2 The column shows the maximum amount of percentage points each NTMs tariff equivalents in services can 
be reduced. 
Note: ‘Abatable’ is the same as ‘actionable’ in CEPR (2013a).  
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on Francois gravity estimates cited in Copenhagen Economics (2009), including 
Ecorys (2009).  
Concerning the EU-Canada study, no gravity model is created for the purpose. Two different 
techniques are adopted, one for goods and one for services. For the former set, NTMs tariff 
equivalents which are ‘actionable’ are assumed to be equal to 2% of trade costs, on the basis of 
“anecdotal evidence of a sample of regulations identified as having trade-inhibiting effects” 
and of “economic assessments of the trade-deepening effect of regional economic integration 
agreements”. For the latter set, it is taken as a reference to what has been achieved by EU MS, 
in terms of services liberalisation, and considered as a scenario that might be feasible in the 
context of CETA. Following this assumption, three studies from Francois et al.57 are taken as 
references. 
                                                   
55 Due to “severe data limitations”, Copenhagen Economics used cross-border trade data. 
56 The theoretical work of Fillat Castejon, Francois and Woerz (2008) has been combined with the OECD 
FDI regulatory restrictiveness index (2007) and the 2009 Ecorys NTM index. In fact, the theoretical work 
above cited is necessary to build the model. It argues that, in the long run, complementarity exists 
between FDI restrictions and trade restrictions. This is crucial to overcome data limitations that 
otherwise would impede a “formal scenario-modelling”. 
57 Francois, Hoekman and Woerz (2007); Francois, Pindyuk and Woerz (2008); and Francois and 
Wignarajan (2008). 
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They estimate that trade in services inside the EU internal market is 35% higher than what 
would be expected without intra-EU liberalisation. This quantification has been used to assess 
the amount of NTMs tariff equivalents reduction, i.e. cost savings, which would be needed for 
creating such an increase. It is found to be in the range from 2% to 10%, depending of the 
service sector. Data was not available for all sectors. Therefore, the aggregate services trade 
NTMs tariff equivalents reduction (equal to 6.27%) has been used where necessary, i.e. trade, 
other finance, insurance and consumer services. The total amount of NTMs tariff equivalents, 
both for EU exports to Canada and for Canada exports to EU, have been estimated by Francois 
et al.58 
3.4 What stylised scenarios for the CGE models? 
Stylised scenarios, or ‘policy options’, are hypothetical and (ideally) mutually exclusive 
situations obtained by different defined uses of diverse trade policy instruments. 
Corresponding CGE outputs rely on the set of assumptions made when designing alternatives. 
Estimated gains or losses – in GDP, welfare, trade volumes, etc. – indicate the difference 
between the so-called ‘baseline’ (the hypothetical future scenario without any policy 
modification) and the generated scenario (which may vary if more than one option has been 
foreseen). 
Consequently, due to the “differential nature” of the results mentioned above, the following 
comparison among the different assessments will also devote attention to the baseline features. 
The TTIP study (CEPR, 2013) assumes the completion of the agreement in 2017, and its full 
implementation ten years later in 2027. It also excludes a possible conclusion of the Doha 
round, as the slow negotiation process decreases the likelihood of this happening. In addition, 
the baseline scenario takes into account “all FTAs currently in place”, and it also includes the 
EU-Singapore and EU-Canada agreements (European Commission, 2013). No explicit 
information is available about how these two agreements have been arranged in the CGE 
model. The study foresees five alternative scenarios or ‘policy options’, already described in 
chapter 1.2.2. 
The EU-Japan study hypothesises the full implementation of the agreement happening in 2018; 
therefore, it projects the underlying economic situation to that year. It does not incorporate the 
Doha round or any other FTA, e.g. EU-Korea. The report delineates two scenarios. Both of 
them envisage complete tariff elimination (100%), whereas NTMs in manufacturing and 
services are dealt with in two scenarios. The minimum reduction scenario considers a trade 
cost reduction ranging from 0.8% (insurance) to 33.8% (transport equipment) for EU exports 
to Japan, and varying between 0.4% (air transport) and 7.3% (chemicals) for Japanese export 
to the EU. The maximum reduction scenario instead calculates a trade cost reduction of 
between 1.2% (insurance) and 41.0% (transport equipment) for EU exports to Japan, and 
between 1.1% (air transport) and 12.1% (chemicals) for Japanese exports to the EU. Tables 8 
and 9 provide a more detailed appraisal of trade cost reductions hypotheses according to the 
two scenarios. 
                                                   
58 Document cited in European Commission and Government of Canada (2008), p. 44. No other detail 
of the document is provided. 
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Table 8. NTMs affecting EU exports to Japan and relative cost reductions 
 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2009). 
Table 9. NTMs affecting EU exports to Japan and relative cost reductions 
 
Source: Ecorys (2009) cited in Copenhagen Economics (2009). 
Baseline Lower Bound Upper Bound
Trade costs 
Estimate 
(%TCE)
Min. 
Reduction 
scenario (% 
point change)
Max. 
Reduction 
scenario (% 
point change) 
Food and beverages 25.0 -6.0 -9.0
Chamicals (incl. pharma) 22.0 -15.0 -20.0
Electrical Machinery 11.6 -2.6 -3.9
Motor vehicles 10.0 -1.2 -3.8
Trasport Equipment (incl. aircraft and rail) 45.0 -33.8 -41.0
Metals and metal products 21.3 -4.3 -6.5
Wood and paper products 15.4 -7.1 -10.6
Other machinery (incl. medical devices) 30.0 -2.9 -3.9
Air Trasport 2.0 -0.9 -1.3
Water transport 8.0 -3.5 -5.2
Finance 15.8 -5.8 -8.7
Insurance 6.5 -0.8 -1.2
Business and ICT 2.5 -2.5 -3.7
Communications 24.7 -12.8 -19.2
Constructions 2.5 -1.2 -1.9
Personal, Cultural and other services 6.5 -2.5 -3.7
Trade costs for Exports to Japan
Baseline Lower Bound Upper Bound
Trade costs 
Estimate 
(%TCE)
Min. 
Reduction 
scenario (% 
point change)
Max. 
Reduction 
scenario (% 
point change) 
Food and beverages na - -
Chamicals (incl. pharma) 18.0 -7.3 -12.1
Electrical Machinery 4.5 -1.7 -2.8
Motor vehicles 16.3 -3.5 -5.3
Trasport Equipment (incl. aircraft and rail) 18.8 -3.1 -5.6
Metals and metal products 6.0 -1.9 -5.2
Other machinery (incl. medical devices) na - -
Air Trasport 2.0 -0.4 -1.1
Water transport 8.0 -1.4 -4.5
Finance 11.3 -2.9 -7.0
Insurance 10.8 -2.8 -5.6
Business and ICT 14.9 -2.5 -4.3
Communications 11.7 -4.3 -8.2
Constructions 4.6 -1.9 -2.6
Personal, Cultural and other services 4.4 -1.0 -2.5
Trade costs for Exports to Eu
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The EU-Canada study assumes 2014 as the reference year, encompassing the successful 
implementation of the Doha round (which, of course, never happened). The report focused on 
one policy option only. The scenario portrays the elimination of all tariffs (and tariff-rate 
quotas) in agricultural and industrial sectors, the “reduction of trade costs generated by non-
tariff measures by an amount equivalent to 2% of the value of trade in non-commodity goods 
sectors”, and a reduction of NTMs tariff equivalents for services between 2% (other business 
services) and 10% (construction services). As in the EU-Japan report, NTMs are not 
symmetrically equal, i.e. NTMs that EU exports face in one sector are different from NTMs 
Canadian exports face in the same sector. Differently from EU-Japan, however, the EU-Canada 
report assumes symmetric cost reductions, for trade both ways, e.g. if trade costs savings in 
sector X are equal to, say, 5%, this is assumed to be valid both for EU exports to Canada and 
for Canadian exports to EU. Table 10 illustrates NTMs and sectoral cost reductions as inserted 
in the CGE model. 
Table 10. NTMs affecting EU-Canada trade and relative cost reductions 
 
Source: European Commission and Government of Canada (2008). 
A comprehensive juxtaposition of the ‘policy options’ as outlined in the three documents 
(CEPR, 2013; Copenhagen Economics, 2009; European Commission and Government of 
Canada, 2008) is provided in Annex II. It compares – when possible – scenarios’ premises and 
relative changes in GDP. 
Interestingly, Ecorys (2009b) also performed an assessment on an EU-Japan FTA, maintaining 
the same hypotheses (and definitions not in line with the literature) shown in Chapter 1.2.4. 
Instead, procedures for NTMs identification differ between the two studies. 
Arguably, results displayed in Table 11 show the CGE sensitivity to methodological choices, 
e.g. how to calculate NTMs, and to how hypothetical policy options are represented. Indeed, 
in the CE report (2009) estimated changes in GDP (from the baseline) range from +0.1% to 
+0.14% for the EU and from +0.2% to +0.31% for Japan. The Ecorys report (2009b) treated the 
Netherlands separately, estimating additional benefit ranging from +0.1% to +0.2%. Effects on 
the EU-26 are negative, and equal to -0.1%. Finally, the report foresees additional growth for 
Japan ranging from +2.4% to 3.2% (depending on the scenario considered). 
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Table 11. Scenarios and changes in GDP baseline (%): EU-Japan 
Scenario 
Description Tariffs reduction 
NTBs reduction (in 
“goods” or 
“manufacturing”) 
NTBs 
reduction (in 
services) 
RES. 
EU-Japan 
(CE, 2009) 
“Lower 
bound 
scenario” 
- 100% - “minimum reduction scenario” 
- “minimum 
reduction 
scenario” 
EU: +0.10 
Japan: +0.20 
(long run 
effects) 
“Upper 
bound 
scenario” 
- 100% - “maximum reduction scenario” 
- “maximum 
reduction 
scenario” 
EU: +0.14  
Japan: +0.31 
(long run 
effects) 
EU-Japan 
(Ecorys, 
2009b) 
“short-run 
effects” - 100% 
See Table 13 
NL: +0.1 
EU-26: - 0.1  
Japan: +2.4 
“long-run 
effects” - 100% 
NL: +0.2 
EU: - 0.1 
Japan: +3.2 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Copenhagen Economics (2009) and Ecorys (2009b). 
 
4. Comparison with other EU-US studies 
The Impact Assessment of the European Commission is not the only quantitative analysis of 
TTIP. While the CEPR (2013a) represents undoubtedly the main reference, there are a few 
other quantitative exercises that, by modifying the background assumptions, have obtained 
different impacts on sectors and expected trade flows. Indeed, we will show that, while it is 
difficult to adopt other models than the CGE, different assumptions mainly on the 
quantification of non-tariff measures and data can affect the final results in interesting ways. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the recent literature assessing the impacts 
of TTIP. We discuss two main streams of contributions:  
 The first (‘satellite studies’) works with the quantifications of NTMs tariff equivalents 
taken from Ecorys (2009) (Kommerskollegium, 2013; Ecorys, 2012; Francois and 
Pindyuk, 2013). In this first group, estimation techniques and data do not vary 
significantly but the focus is on the effects for specific EU countries and American states; 
 A second (‘alternative studies’) includes two studies (Fontagné et al., 2013, and 
Felbermayr et al., 201359) that introduce either new NTMs quantitative estimations in a 
CGE model or employ another model (not CGE) as well as other assumptions that of 
course lead to distinct results.  
                                                   
59 Fontagne et al. (2013) will be treated as a synonym of CEPII (2013), and Felbermayr et al. will be 
treated as a synonym of Bertelsmann/GED (2013). 
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4.1 Satellite studies 
The Ecorys survey acted as a building block not only for the CEPR study (2013) – which 
constitutes the groundwork for the Commission IA – but also for a group of satellite studies. 
These four studies analysed the prospective TTIP, with only marginal differences in the 
methodology, e.g. in a few background hypotheses or in the represented scenarios. Each 
focussed on one EU member state, namely Austria (FIW, 2013), Sweden (Kommerskollegium, 
2013), the Netherlands (Ecorys, 2012) and the United Kingdom (CEPR, 2013b). 
Reported differences are attributable to four aspects: 
 the consideration of the EU level, i.e. whether the report includes and reports explicitly 
the effects on the EU (or EU minus the member state concerned); 
 use of NTBs estimations done by Ecorys (2009a);  
 calculations of static and dynamic effects, namely whether the model focuses only on 
reallocation of resources between sectors, efficiency gains due to cost reduction, i.e. 
increase in productivity due to a more competitive environment, and terms of trade, i.e. 
ratio of export over import prices, change; or whether the model also accounts for 
dynamic effects;60 and 
 the number of scenarios described in the report. 
Table 12 compares those options with respect to these four differences. 
Table 12. Relevant hypothesis and scenarios: Satellite studies comparison 
Relevant issue 
EU-level 
considered EU-US NTBs 
Static or 
dynamic effects 
Scenarios 
(number, 
excluding 
baseline) 
Report 
FIW (2013) NO 
Based on Ecorys 
(2009a) and Dee et 
al. (2011)1 
Both 1 
Kommerskollegium 
(2013) YES 
Based on Ecorys 
(2009a)2 
Static (No 
representation 
of FDI) 
3 
Ecorys (2012) YES Based on Ecorys (2009a, 2009b)2 Both 2 
CEPR (2013b) YES Based on Ecorys (2009a)3 Both 4 
1 Austrian NTBs are assumed to be equal to EU NTBs. 
2 Sweden NTBs are assumed to be equal to EU NTBs (reported explicitly). 
3 UK NTBs are assumed to be equal to EU NTBs. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on FIW (2013), Kommerskollegium (2013), Ecorys (2012) and CEPR (2013b). 
                                                   
60 Meaning it calculates capital accumulation, changes in factor returns (of labour and capital) and 
convergence to a so-called ‘steady state’ (a term in economic growth theory expressing that, after a 
number of years, all effects generating such dynamics have worked out and no further changes in 
growth take place).  
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One peculiarity deserves attention. The Ecorys report on the Netherlands (Ecorys, 2012) does 
not make any original computation for assessing the benefits of an eventual EU-US trade 
agreement, apart from deriving the Netherlands benefits from the EU agreements. 
The results shown are based on two earlier Ecorys reports (2009a, 2009b). One of them (2009b) 
distinguished the concept of ‘barriers in services trade’ from the larger category of ‘non-tariff 
barriers’, whereas the other (Ecorys 2009a) does not use this ‘separate accounting’. Even 
though one might suspect that one of these two (possibly the first) should be linked to the 
concept of ‘regulatory heterogeneity’, the report does not clarify the point, as it does not 
include any meaningful explanation (Ecorys, 2009b). Thus it is impossible to discern the 
precise effects of the assumptions made in this specific scenario. For the sake of completeness, 
Table 13 reports the scenario hypothesised by Ecorys (2009b).  
Table 13. Ecorys ‘separate accounting’ 
Hypothesis Reduction 
Tariffs for trade in goods (except some sensitivities in agricultural 
products) - 100% 
Barriers to services (average) - 75% 
Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs) - 2.5% 
Source: Ecorys (2009b). 
A comprehensive juxtaposition of the ‘policy options’ as outlined in the various ‘satellite 
studies’ is provided in the Annex (Table AIII. 4). It compares – where possible – scenarios’ 
premises and relative changes in GDP. 
In Error! Reference source not found., we juxtapose the relevant aspects presented in both 
Ecorys reports. Constraints on available data limit the comparability for real income effects, 
expressed in absolute terms, i.e. millions of euro, and to the terms of trade, in relative terms, 
i.e. in percent.  
Table 14. Ecorys exercises on an EU-US agreement: Results 
 
Real income change 
(€ millions) Terms of trade (% change) 
EU-26 US NL EU-26 US NL 
Short-run 
Ecorys (2009a) – Limited 18,738 7,817 610 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
Ecorys (2009a) – Ambitious 44,437 18,992 1,411 0.11 -0.15 0.12 
Ecorys (2009b) 15,261 17,959 246 0.0 0.1 -0.2 
Long-run 
 EU-26 US NL EU-26 US NL 
Ecorys (2009a) – Limited 51,744 18,343 1,811 0.03 -0.10 0.03 
Ecorys (2009a) – Ambitious 117,413 40,781 4,076 0.07 -0.23 0.07 
Ecorys (2009b) 34,927 24,062 1,375 0.0 0.1 -0.2 
Sources: Ecorys (2009a) and Ecorys (2009b). 
Real income estimations fluctuate greatly between the two studies. In the short run, EU-26 
(excluding the Netherlands) benefits vary from €15 billion to almost three times that sum, €44 
billion. Comparing the corresponding values for the US shows no relevant difference (Table 
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14). In the long run EU26 benefits range from €35 to €117 billion, whereas US benefits vary 
from €18 to €41 billion. Concerning the terms of trade, changes also include the reversion of 
its direction. Depending on the study and on the scenario, EU-26 terms of trade can be positive 
(+0.11% in the short term; +0.07% in the long term) or neutral (equal to zero both in the short 
and long terms). Even sharper is the difference for the US, for which the terms of trade can be 
either positive (+0.1% both in the short term and long terms) or negative (-0.15% in the short 
term; -0.23% in the long term). 
 “The TTIP and the 50 States”61 is another study based on CEPR (2013a), developed by the 
Bertlesmann Foundation. It provides an estimation of the economic impact – in terms of 
exports and employment – at state level in the US, in the case of an ‘ambitious agreement’ as 
defined by CEPR.62 Nevertheless, it does not assume full employment (as CEPR does) at the 
moment of full implementation of TTIP, i.e. 2027. This has been made possible by assuming 
increased labour demand and wages. 
The study estimated the impacts by industry at the national level first, distributing them at the 
state level on the basis of projections. One of the keys for ‘creating’ positive effects is companies 
and consumers having access to cheaper goods and services, which liberates (additional) 
resources to be spent. This (additional) spending is in itself job-creating. 
4.2 Alternative studies 
In the second group of contributions we refer to two studies that are more comparable to the 
CEPR report. 
In Fontagne et al. (2013),63 the MIRAGE64 model has been estimated by partially relying on the 
GTAP database (for Social Accounting Matrices65) but otherwise on MAcMap-HS6 (CEPII-
ITC)66 for ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff protection.  
Compared to the CEPR analysis, in Fontagne et al. (2013) the measurement of average 
protection (AVE) in cross-border trade in services is computed through a quantitative-based 
methodology for nine service sectors in 65 countries. This is a different approach than that of 
Ecorys, 2009, whose estimates result from a large business survey conducted in 23 sectors 
between the EU and the US.67 The two approaches lead to different levels of tariff equivalents 
as shown inError! Reference source not found. As in Ecorys (2009), NTMs in goods and 
                                                   
61 Atlantic Council, Bertlesmann Foundation and the British Embassy in Washington, 2013, “TTIP and 
the Fifty States: Jobs and Growth from Coast to Coast”, September. 
62 Ecorys (2009a) is used to provide NTM estimations. The Trade Partnership’s CDxports database is 
used as underlying dataset.  
63 Fontagne, L., J. Gourdon and S. Jean (2013), “Transatlantic Trade: Whiter Partnership, Which 
Economic Consequences?”, CEPII Policy Brief No. 12, September. 
64 MIRAGE is a multi-sector, multi-country CGE model developed by a consortium led by CEPII in 2001. 
Being a general equilibrium model, MIRAGE represents world trade in a context of general equilibrium 
where production and consumption of different countries interact among themselves through different 
behavioural assumptions.  
65 Social Accounting Matrices are matrices that represent national flows on economic transactions 
among all the economic agents (firm, household, government, rest of economy and net investment). 
66 Market Access Map is a database providing a measurement of applied tariff duties. The database is 
constructed in a way that is useful to quantify ad valorem equivalent (in percentage) of applied 
protection for exporter, importer and product 
(http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=12). 
67 For a more profound comparison between the approaches, see chapter 2. 
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agricultural products are higher than in services, while US services look more protected than 
goods compared to Ecorys where the opposite is found. However, the estimations of AVE in 
services provided by CEPII are much higher than the ones used in Ecorys. 
Table 15. Estimated costs of NTMs for transatlantic trade (%) 
  CEPII Ecorys 
  EU US EU US 
Agriculture 48.2 51.3 56.8 73.3 
Manufacturing  42.8 32.3 19.3 23.4 
Services 32.0 47.3 8.5 8.9 
Note: Estimates from CEPII refer to the ‘Reference’ scenario. In order to compare the two sets of figures, 
estimates both from CEPII and Ecorys refer to unweighted averages across the model sectors for NTM AVE 
protection.  
Source: CEPII (2013). 
As in other exercises, the authors define a ‘baseline’ scenario, i.e. characterised by a growth 
path that we would observe without any TTIP agreement. Once the outcome of possible 
agreements is calculated, the difference provides an estimate of the economic impacts. All the 
scenarios defined, other than the baseline one, include the gradual removal of all tariffs 
according to the timetable agreed in CETA. 
NTBs, in general, can be removed only partially, hence assumptions on the degree of removal 
(‘actionability’) are required. Five scenarios are described as follows: 
 ‘Reference’ scenario: a 25% cut in the level of trade restrictiveness: as outlined by the 
authors, a further harmonisation process in services inside the EU would be helpful to 
reinforce the impact of this scenario. 
 ‘Tariffs only’: characterised by tariff liberalisation only. 
 ‘Targeted NTM Cuts’: AVE protection in agriculture, industry and services due to NTMs 
cut by 30% for the upper half of sectors initially more protected and by 15% for the lower 
half. 
 ‘Harmonisation Spill-overs’: reduction of 5% of trade restrictiveness of NTMs for third 
countries as a result of the harmonisation process for the two signatories. 
 ‘Ecorys NTMs’: the ‘reference’ scenario with the assessment of Ecorys. This works as a 
robustness check. 
Among these scenarios, the ‘reference scenario’ replicates the degree of ambition of the free 
trade agreement that is likely to be discussed during the TTIP negotiations.  
Table 16 compares the percentage changes of exports and expected GDP in the long run 
compared to the baseline expected path (using 2025 as a reference year) for the EU and the US 
according to the different scenarios. 
We immediately notice that there is a huge difference between the expected increase in exports 
for the US (10.1%) and the EU68 (only 2.3%). US exports increase mainly in agricultural and 
services; for the EU mainly in services and industry. At the same time, imports are expected 
to increase by 7.5% in the US and 2.2% in the EU. Fontagne et al. (2013) also expects EU exports 
                                                   
68 Figures on EU trade flows included intra-EU trade. 
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to be partly reoriented outside the EU in all three sectors, although the possibility of this 
happening in services is strongly influenced by the completion of the single market.  
Long-term impacts on total GDP in the ‘reference scenario’ will be modest for both economies 
(0.3%), with uneven effects on the different sectors. Indeed, while agriculture in the US is 
expected to grow by 1.9%, in EU-27 the same sector will experience a modest contraction 
(0.8%). Results are slightly more conservative with respect to the Commission exercise in the 
most ambitious scenario (0.5% and 0.4%). Compared to the ‘reference scenario’, very small 
gains are estimated for a ‘tariffs only’ scenario, confirming that a large percentage of the 
expected growth is due to NTM cuts. However, the computational method of NTMs matters, 
as shown by the ‘alternative NTM’ scenario, which applies the methodology suggested by 
Ecorys and the IA. As noticed by the authors, higher tariffs equivalents’ removal (in other 
words, higher ‘actionability’) generates higher impacts on trade flows and GDP. 
Progressive removal of NTMs as suggested by ‘targeted NTM cuts’ and third countries spill-
overs (harmonisation spill-overs) affect positively exports and GDP by adding a few basis 
points to the negotiations outcome. 
Table 16. Long-term impact on EU and US exports and real income (%) 
 
Note: EU exports also include intra-EU trade; trade is in volume; percentage deviation from the baseline in 
2025. 
Source: CEPII (2013). 
One objective of the trade agreement is to boost bilateral trade. In this respect, Figure 3 shows 
that US exports to the EU and EU exports to the US are expected to increase by 52.5% and 49%, 
respectively. The sector benefitting the most from bilateral trade liberalisation is agriculture 
(mainly dairy products, meats and fibre crops) for both signatories: it will more than double. 
In services, the increase is very small, yet larger for the EU (24%, compared to 14% in the US): 
this is explained by the initial level of liberalisation in both economies, where, especially, in 
the EU, intra-EU regulatory divergences in services play an important role. This finding 
reveals that insurance, finance and business services will be the sectors most affected by the 
agreement.  
Finally, in industries where regulatory heterogeneity might be smaller, gains are equal for both 
economies and mostly concentrated in machinery, chemicals, transport equipment and 
electronics. 
Exports
Total 
GDP
Exports
Total 
GDP
Exports
Total 
GDP
Exports
Total 
GDP
Exports
Total 
GDP
USA 10.1 0.3 2.1 0 10.4 0.3 14.5 0.5 5.4 0.2
EU 2.3 0.3 0.4 0 1.9 0.2 3.4 0.5 1.3 0.1
Reference Tariffs Only
Targeted NTMs 
cut
Harmonization 
Spillovers
Alternative NTM
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Figure 3. Long-term impact on bilateral exports in the ‘reference scenario’ (in %) 
 
Source: CEPII (2013). 
The previous section has shown how the assumptions can influence the findings in trade 
agreements assessments. The study proposed by Bertelsmann/GED on the impacts of 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership can explain even more starkly why this is 
true. Note that the study is not directly linked to the current content of negotiations and makes 
quite different assumptions compared to the approach followed by the Commission through 
the CEPR study. 
Before going into methodology, it ought to be noted that the findings of the Bertelsmann study 
are radically different from other studies. In other words, it is an outlier. Whilst other studies 
do not obtain overall GDP effects beyond 1%, and in CEPR (2013) and Fontagne et al. (2013) 
only half of that, Bertelsmann (2013) obtains a GDP increment of – incredibly – 13% for the US 
and 5% for the EU. For the US, this finding is approximately 25 times the result in CEPR (2013a) 
and this raises suspicions about its plausibility. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation 
shows how implausible this result is, even when ignoring the CEPR study. US exports to the 
EU amount to some 3.5% of US GDP and a good deal of these exports are already free of 
barriers or face low barriers. Thus only part of the existing trade would be positively affected 
by TTIP, no matter how ambitious. Generating eventually no less than 13% extra US GDP from 
the sectors that are hindered today by NTMs (and sometimes tariffs) – whilst other (sub)sectors 
might be affected hardly or not at all – is most implausible, if not impossible. The case of the 
EU is less extreme but still pretty radical, with ten times the effect found in CEPR when the 
scenario is ambitious. Whereas CGE-GTAP models probably underestimate GDP effects due 
to the absence of dynamic effects, we are not aware of scholars arguing that this shortcoming 
would make a difference of this magnitude or even anywhere near it. Another example about 
the implausibility is given when looking at Canada, with a decrease in its GDP of some 9%. 
This must imply a gigantic trade diversion away from Canada-US trade due to TTIP. The 
Bertelsmann study does not incorporate spill-overs to third countries such as Canada, but that 
might lead to modest disadvantages for Canada, but not such enormous GDP shocks. The 
economic crisis, for example, affected Canada much less. But NAFTA, the regulatory and 
(profound) technical standards cooperation with the US and CETA all seem to be ignored as 
well. We shall proceed, below, with an explanation of the study, but it is (very) unlikely (to 
put it mildly) that this work can serve as a guide for MEPs or EU policy-makers at large.  
The underlying model is, as in the other studies, a computable general equilibrium with one 
main difference: in this specific case, the authors combine a typical econometric exercise with 
a simulated scenario as if NAFTA or EU integration was achievable over the Atlantic. What 
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this implies is very simple: the Commission IA assessment has tried to quantify trade costs – 
tariffs and (mainly) non-tariff barriers (see Ecorys, 2009) – in order to estimate future trade 
flows that could potentially derive from the (partial) removal of them. Their removal is clearly 
linked to the degree of ‘actionability’ that, as discussed previously, is exclusively obtained 
from experts’ opinions.  
In this analysis instead, the authors derive trade costs by observing (overall) trade flows and 
how they increased in previous agreements, notably (intra) EU and (intra) NAFTA. Thus they 
assume that the EU-US agreement, when it will enter into force, would reproduce very long-
run trade creation effects of existing trade agreements such as the EU or NAFTA. The trade 
pattern created by those agreements (a trade flow increase of 80%) helps to estimate a trade 
costs matrix on the basis of a gravity equation. 
There is no doubt that this quite extreme assumption drives the entire structure of findings of 
this study. Analytically, it is most convenient, as it allows avoiding the (difficult and) elaborate 
exercise of how to quantify non-tariff measures and how ‘actionable’ they are. However, it is 
hard not to infer that it looks quite unrealistic. Findings on GDP are extremely wide-ranging 
and far too dependent on a trade openness effect, which is derived from ‘deep’ integration 
between contiguous economies in North America and in Europe. This seems most unlikely 
ever to be reproduced over the North Atlantic.  
This brings us to the second characteristic of the study, namely the definition of the policy 
scenarios. Compared to CEPR and CEPII, we have only two possibilities. The first is limited to 
(almost) total removal of tariffs by reducing the trade costs matrix69 to the extent to which 
tariffs can no longer affect trade patterns between the EU and the US. The second includes a 
liberalised scenario that, unlike the possibilities studied in the IA, is independent from any 
degree of actionability of non-tariff measures. Indeed, their matrix of trading costs is solely 
derived from the simulation of observed trade flows of existing, deep trade agreements.  
Policy scenarios, described in this way, are simply too different from each other. They do not 
even allow for intermediate possibilities that are more likely to take place. The great 
discrepancy can also be noticed from the huge gap between their findings in the limited and 
fully liberalised scenario. 
Another difference worth mentioning is the use of country data. Contrary to the IA, economic 
variables are not aggregated by region but considered one by one for a total of 126 countries. 
This allows specifying trade diversion effects within each region, where some member states 
could get more benefits than others. In the EU, for instance, member states such as Germany 
and the UK will benefit more in the liberalised scenario, by replacing other member states with 
the US as trade partner (to some extent). Besides calculating country specific expected gains 
for the EU and the US, the exercise is also extended to third countries by reproducing the 
expected trade flows that took place in already existing agreements. This way of modelling 
the third countries effects avoids the discussion on spill-over effects seen in the IA. However, 
negative – indeed, often very negative – outcomes in both scenarios (with the same gaps 
observed for the signatories) for almost all third countries seem unrealistic, even to the authors 
themselves.70 As extensively explained in chapter 2, spill-over effects are difficult to predict 
without knowing the incentives that third countries have to join the regulatory frameworks 
                                                   
69 As we will explain below, the matrix here helps to estimate bilateral costs (tariffs and non-tariffs) 
between every pair of countries.  
70 “Under certain circumstances, it is even realistic for countries that already have free-trade agreements 
with the EU or USA to indirectly participate in negotiations…so their concerns are taken into 
account…This does not show up in the calculation, so the negative welfare effects may be exaggerated”. 
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that could be envisaged by the negotiations. Geographic proximity, existing trade agreements 
with one or the other signatory, could impact third countries in different ways. Moreover, the 
actual way through which non-tariff barriers will be removed (either by harmonising the 
regulatory framework in specific domains or by mutually recognising or adopting 
international standards) could influence the incentives and thus the costs to adapt the system 
of a third country to the one adopted by the EU and the US. In this respect, the econometric 
estimates do not provide – in this case as in others – a clear picture of how the system of 
incentives for third countries will actually work. 
The final important point to address in the Bertelsmann/GED report is the role of labour 
markets. Different from previous studies that assume in the long run that supply and demand 
of labour are equal, thereby neglecting the existence of involuntary employment, in this study 
the labour market is included according to a theory of unemployment that allows the existence 
of frictional unemployment also in boom periods. Its presence is due to the fact that frictions 
and labour institutions can affect the unemployment rates regardless of the economic cycle. 
However, data for this kind of approach are limited to 28 OECD countries, omitting the market 
structure of entire regions such as South America and parts of Asia and Africa. In general – 
and this is a positive aspect – the introduction of search employment theory allows for the 
creation of new jobs following a certain policy shock, such as TTIP. 
Conclusions 
The empirical economic analysis underlying the European Commission’s Impact Assessment 
of TTIP is particularly difficult because of two principal reasons. First, TTIP is a most unusual 
bilateral trade agreement. Apart from the sheer economic size of the two partners and their 
economic intercourse today, its nature is more like a wide-ranging regulatory compact, with 
some elements of classical trade agreements as well. The regulatory core of TTIP makes it 
extremely difficult for economists to come to grips with the expected economic meaning of the 
negotiation outcomes. NTBs and mere regulatory heterogeneity create ‘trade costs’ for market 
access both ways, but it is exceedingly hard to assess authoritatively what the trade costs are 
and what consequences they have, whether for goods or services. Yet without good proxies of 
those costs and the scope for their reduction, an empirical economic analysis with proper 
modelling is either impossible or mere sophisticated guesswork. Second, TTIP is so wide-
ranging that a so-called partial (equilibrium) approach – already second-best at any rate – 
would be totally inappropriate. Therefore, this type of economic analysis is made with the help 
of modern CGE models. Such highly complicated and demanding empirical general 
equilibrium models are capable of addressing most interactions between horizontal and 
sectoral negotiated aspects of TTIP, presenting sectoral effects (after incorporating such 
interactions), extending the immediate effects in the specific goods and services markets to 
their impact in labour markets, and arriving at changes of trade flows as well as overall 
increments to GDP. Each one of these two reasons is already a tall order; together they amount 
to an enormous challenge.  
Against this background, the aim of this paper was to analyse the appropriateness and validity 
of the economic modelling behind the Commission’s IA in assessing the potential impacts of 
such a potential trade and investment agreement. 
In this research paper we have addressed the following questions:71  
                                                   
71 The conclusions are structured according to the questions raised by the Terms of Reference for this 
assignment.  
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1) Does the CGE model used by the Commission correspond to the analytical needs of the 
ex ante impact assessment of such potential trade and investment agreement? 
The broad answer is: yes. There are indeed no better alternatives to assess the impacts of trade 
agreements than CGE modelling. Indeed, as amply shown, it allows modelling the behaviour 
of actors in the entire economy, including many sectors. Then, the GTAP database provides a 
strong and continuously updated source of reliable data. The methodology, however, also 
presents some drawbacks, such as the peculiarities through which the labour market and 
investments are included, the lack of innovation effects, and results on productivity-growth of 
the different size of enterprises. Having said that, and besides pure methodological issues, 
CGE modelling does not perform at its best when assessing deep trade agreements such as the 
one between the EU and the US, which is mainly based on (partial) removal of non-tariff 
measures. We have seen how assumptions on their quantification, together with other 
variables that are difficult to estimate, can influence the final findings considerably. However, 
we have also to admit that there are no better alternative tools to estimate long-term impacts 
of such a complicated trade agreement. 
2) Has the Commission adequately assessed the environmental and social impacts and, in 
particular, is there a standard model available that could have been used to quantify 
the number of jobs potentially created by the agreement? 
Environmental impacts have been adequately assessed, insofar as CO2 emissions are 
concerned, but there are many environmental aspects other than climate, and they are not 
included – they probably depend critically on the exact terms of some sectoral issues. Due to 
the sectoral aggregation imposed by the quantification of NTBs (from Ecorys, 2009a) and scant 
knowledge, at that time, of the content of the negotiations, it was indeed difficult to cover other 
aspects.  
Concerning social impacts, exclusively represented by impacts on the labour market, we have 
thoroughly explained that free trade agreements modelled by CGE do not deliver employment 
effects, as they assume perfect equilibrium between supply and demand of labour in the long 
run. Production increase, however, demands more labour in a specific sector having a raising 
effect on wages that can be interpreted as employment increases. This can be said especially if 
wages do not immediately react to policy shocks (such as a free trade agreement).  
In the recent literature, the only possibility to model unemployment effects (in modern CGE 
models) was to incorporate a new theory of unemployment (also known as ‘search 
unemployment’) that allows the creation of new jobs or to hypothesise that changes in wages 
are very sensitive to change in labour demand.  
3) Are the samples used (including samples of sectors, spill-over effects and the 
representativeness of the household) appropriate?  
First, the sample of sectors is surely acceptable, given that the sample incorporates all the 
sectors where NTBs are known to be a serious hindrance for trade and investment. It would 
seem that adding more sectors or disaggregating sectors (which also adds to complexity and 
requires many more observations and data) would not add much value, at the stage prior to 
even deciding the negotiating mandate.  
Second, the spill-over effects are also largely influenced by the sample of countries and how 
those have been aggregated. In this respect, the sample of countries (now 40) could have been 
larger. Again, this is a burden on the calculations (assuming that data are adequate); yet if 
timing allows, especially adding a larger group of developing countries might have been 
interesting. However, it would also depend on how the relationships in global value chains 
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between suppliers from developing and TTIP countries would be approached and (in CGE 
models or even macroeconometric models, already less suitable for trade purposes) this is next 
to impossible without ‘heroic’ assumptions, possibly derived from recent empirical OECD 
work on global value chains. Still, the question merely links the sample of countries issue to 
the spill-over issue – this is too restrictive, because one ideally would want to know the effects 
on many developing countries as well when spill-overs would be zero. The spill-over issue in 
CEPR (2013a) is treated (read: postulated) in an arbitrary way, but, admittedly, it is not easy 
to do any better. We have inserted an initial analytical basis for providing an underpinning of 
assumed spill-over rates. More should be done here, especially by bringing in a sectoral 
perspective and distinguishing different methods of regulatory convergence, e.g. 
harmonisation versus mutual recognition.  
Third, the representativeness of households refers to a modelling technique in CGE models 
of employing a ‘single’ household (or, in other words, millions of perfectly identical 
households, taken together). This ‘household’ acts according to standard microeconomic 
principles, which indeed are stylised. Altering this fundamental building block in CGE models 
is likely to be very difficult, if not impossible, certainly when such a change in the underlying 
model would have to be used in a short-term contract. It would probably require testing the 
model with respect to different variations of the ‘household’ and obtain robust relationships 
first, before applying it empirically. Also, the data would have to support working with 
distinct types of ‘households’ for many countries.  
4) Has the Commission adequately made reasonable assumptions about the content of the 
potential TTIP agreement and analysed in sufficient detail the options and the potential 
impacts? 
Our report supports the following short answers only based on analytical issues.  
For the purpose of defining a baseline scenario, the current state of EU-US trade and 
investment relations is adequately analysed – more and refined analysis is of course possible 
but would not add value for the purpose of using the CGE-GTAP model, as this model can 
only handle rather stylised approaches (and no other model would be capable of yielding 
more, in this respect). Are the assumptions about a prospective TTIP agreement ‘reasonable’? 
The answer is yes, taking into account what can and cannot be done, e.g. public procurement 
is already difficult to model and issues such as IPRs or broader aspects of regulatory 
cooperation are simply beyond the current capabilities.  
The predominance of NTBs, reflecting regulatory barriers for economic intercourse across the 
Atlantic, is fully justified. This is the core problem in TTIP. But it is also extremely difficult to 
address properly in any economic model and very few examples exist where this has been 
attempted. The cost of regulatory barriers (that is, tariff equivalents of NTMs) is a major 
problem, no doubt, and the background study supporting the Commission’s IA has done what 
is safe: relying on the elaborate and wide-ranging study of Ecorys (2009a), which is second to 
none (except for services).  
The actionability of NTBs is essentially based on the insights of many sectoral experts that 
Ecorys involved in the study. Given the scope of this paper, it is impossible to ‘know better’ 
objectively. In any case, less and more ambitious scenarios as to actionability have been used 
and this is to be applauded. The direct and indirect spill-overs are arbitrary, as noted, and 
more should be done on this. Further work might build upon the relatively simple exercise we 
have offered in chapter 2.  
Going by this exercise (which is too limited, admittedly), the probability of large spill-overs is 
far from obvious, except for five countries already having privileged trade and investment 
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relations with TTIP countries, i.e. Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, Mexico and Canada. So-
called ‘domino effects’ in the world economy might well have to be incentivised explicitly via 
bilateral or plurilateral offers, e.g. in MRAs, or in negotiations. As to the development of the 
‘real’ world economy, we show that – when comparing IAs of recent trade agreements – quite 
different growth paths have been used and this may hinder the comparability of results 
between them. Given the crisis, the assumed path in the TTIP IA seems not unreasonable. The 
options analysed appear sufficient to us, because further refinement in an analysis like this 
would not bring much value-added for the MEPs. On the many impacts referred to, the effects 
on cross-border investments have remained outside the CGE model. 
The rather general notion of ‘the’ competitiveness of European business is not analytically 
useful in an approach like this – it critically depends on sectoral NTBs and their removal. Some 
sectors in the EU are less competitive and others more competitive vis-à-vis the US – the model 
is useful in the sense that it clearly shows that other sectors’ gains may actually help the 
relatively weaker sectors to do ‘less bad’. The impact on SMEs cannot be modelled in CGE 
models. It would probably require partial approaches, with (what in economics are called) 
‘heterogeneous firms’, whether in size or performance. Such refinements are a natural 
complement to this CGE-based analysis.  
Finally, the impact on WTO partners, in particular on developing countries, has been 
discussed above. In a model like this, it all depends on the spill-overs. It is possible to do much 
more work on this issue, also distinguishing distinct methods of regulatory convergence, as 
noted, but one should not be under the illusion that this will be easy in general – case studies 
might well be suitable, with the concomitant risk that only ‘special cases’ would get attention.  
5) Do you consider the Commission’s findings based on these presumptions and 
assumptions to be reasonable?  
Yes, they are reasonable for the TTIP signatories, although maybe too conservative due to the 
low level of NTBs, especially in services. The findings on impacts on third countries could 
suffer from a non-specific methodology on quantification of spill-over effects (also, 
Bertelsmann does not offer a valid alternative). Here more research is needed. Although there 
are serious shortcomings, a better methodology is not available. 
6) In terms of the methodologies and economic modelling, assumptions and qualitative 
and quantitative analysis, how does the IA on the potential TTIP agreement compare 
to the Commission’s other recent impact assessments on the EU’s trade and investment 
agreements (notably the one with Japan)?  
Comparing results between different IAs should be handled with care. We have tried to 
compare the economic methodology applied to the EU-US case with the analyses performed 
for two other free trade agreements, all of them based on the crucial assumption of quantifying 
NTBs. The three studies, i.e. EU-US, EU-Japan and EU-Canada, exhibit profound differences, 
particularly as regards analysed market structures, underlying data used for macroeconomic 
forecast, assessment of NTBs and policy scenarios.  
Such multiple divergences are bound to influence the final results of each assessment, 
particularly the specific gains (or losses) over time, sectorally and between countries. 
Therefore, arguing solely on the basis of the CGE estimations that one agreement would be 
more (or less) beneficial than another would not make much economic sense, and could be 
seriously misleading. 
If the recent trend of performing, in addition to the TSIA, an IA in compliance with the 
Commission IA Guidelines (as is the case for EU-US and EU-Japan) would become standard 
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policy, greater comparability could be achieved and also cover impacts that are currently not 
subsumed in the CGE modelling by separate exercises. 
7) In terms of modelling, assumptions, and findings on impact, how does the IA compare 
to other recent studies on the potential TTIP agreement? 
We have analysed the modelling, assumptions and findings of all the most recent studies that 
analyse the potential impacts of the EU-US free trade agreement. We have divided the two 
groups of studies: one includes two reports that make different assumptions and arrive at 
different findings. A second group is comprised of what we have called ‘satellite studies’ 
because they represent different applications of the CEPR report on which the Commission IA 
is based. The CGE modelling is applied by all of them. 
While the second group cannot be in disagreement with the methodology applied by the 
Commission IA, the first group has been carefully analysed. 
In Fontagne et al. (2013) the importance of the EU-US negotiations is confirmed, only if it 
reaches a partial removal of NTBs, confirming the finding of the EU-US IA. Conversely, the 
measurement of average protection (AVE) in cross-border trade in services is computed 
through a quantitative-based methodology on nine service sectors in 65 countries. This implies 
different results of tariff equivalents (much higher in cross-border services, for instance). 
However, final findings on GDP effects do not vary dramatically compared to those of the IA; 
indeed, the final outcome (GDP) for both signatories is slightly more conservative (0.3% for 
both), probably due to the higher level of NTBs computed. The spill-over effects are defined 
here as a further reduction of 5% of trade restrictiveness of NTMs for third countries as a result 
of the harmonisation process for the two signatories. As in the Commission IA, the percentage 
is based on the debate among expert groups and, so far, represents the only possible way. 
The second study is the Bertelsmann/GED report on the effects of TTIP. It provides a different 
CGE approach, based on a simulated scenario, computed on the basis of existing agreements, 
e.g. the EU, NAFTA. Comparing TTIP potential with that of the EU (or NAFTA) is clearly 
unrealistic and, as in previous studies, it drives the enormous country-specific effects (also in 
terms of spill-overs) reported in the study.  
Besides this, we have also noticed interesting characteristics such as the disaggregation of 
country data and the treatment of the job market. 
8) Is the given quantitative and qualitative information/analysis)? 
For the reasons set out below, we can only give a general reply to this question. The PMR 
indicators are not identical to market access barriers. Moreover, these indicators are often 
designed for specific sectors, such as network and services sectors, and not for manufacturing 
and agriculture (sectors covered by TTIP). The scope of PMR is thus much broader. A second 
conclusion is that the mapping between the sectors of the TTIP study and of the sectors in the 
OECD PMR study is very inadequate. Therefore, it is very hard to compare these indicators. 
NTB indicators derived from gravity analysis are often biased, because they are not directly 
observable. 
9) Does the IA assess correctly the effects of a possible reduction of the duplication of work 
on both sides of the Atlantic on the number and quality of jobs, in particular with regard 
to low-skilled labour and SMEs, as well as the number of jobs in regulatory 
institutions? If not, what would be the likely effects? 
The reduction of the duplication due to mutual recognition of testing and certifications or 
inspection expresses itself in a welfare gain, but of course it reduces the demand for testing 
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activities or inspections. Inevitably, this might lead to some reduction in the number of jobs in 
testing and certification, but the model is not refined enough to calculate this. For the question 
of SMEs and jobs in regulatory institutions, as noted, the model does not give any answer 
because firms are not distinguished as to firm size and the low-skilled jobs are only included 
for the 20 sectors, not for regulatory institutions. 
52  PELKMANS, LEJOUR, SCHREFLER, MUSTILLI & TIMINI 
 
References 
Ackerman, F. (2005), “The Shrinking Gains from Trade: A Critical Assessment of Doha Round 
Projections”, GDAE Working Paper No. 05-01, Global Development and Environment 
Institute, Tufts University, Medford, MA. 
Alemanno, A. and A.C.M. Meuwese (2013), “What role for impact assessment in non-
legislative rule-making?”, European Law Journal, 19(1):76-92. 
Anderson, J.E. and E. van Wincoop (2003), “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border 
Puzzle”, American Economic Review, 93(1):170-192. 
Arkolakis, C., A. Costinot and A. Rodriguez-Claire (2012), “New trade models, same old 
gains?”, American Economic Review, 102(1):94-130. 
Armington, P.S. (1969), “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of 
Production”, IMF Staff Papers 16(1), International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.,  
pp. 159-178. 
Atlantic Council, Bertlesmann Foundation and the British Embassy in Washington (2013), 
“TTIP and the Fifty States: Jobs and Growth from Coast to Coast”, September. 
Bchir, M.H., Y. Decreux, J-L. Guerin and S. Jean (2002), “MIRAGE, a Computable General 
Equilibrium Model for Trade Policy Analysis”, CEPII Working Paper No. 2002-17, 
CEPII, Paris.  
Boeter, S. and L. Savard (2013), “The labour market in CGE models”, in P. Dixon and D. 
Jorgenson (eds), The Handbook of CGE Modelling, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Brown, D.K. and R.M. Stern (1989), “U.S.-Canada bilateral tariff elimination: The role of 
product differentiation and market structure”, in R.C. Feenstra (ed), Trade policies for 
international competitiveness, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Brown, D.K. and R.M. Stern (2001), “Measurement and Modeling of the Economic Effects of 
Trade and Investment Barriers in Services”, Review of International Economics, 9(2):262-
286.  
Carr, D., J.R. Markusen and K.E. Maskus (2001), “Estimating the knowledge capital model of 
the multinational enterprise”, American Economic Review, 91:3:693-708. 
CEPII/ATLASS (2010), “The Economic Impact of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the 
European Union and Korea”, Report for the European Commission – DG Trade. 
CEPR (2013a), ”Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment, An Economic 
Assessment”, Final Project Report under Implementing Framework Contract 
TRADE10/A2/A16 by Francois et al. 
CEPR (2013b), “Estimating the Economic Impact on the UK of a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States”, Final Project Report. 
Copenhagen Economics (2009), “Assessment of Barriers to Trade and Investment between the 
EU and Japan”, Final Report. 
Copenhagen Economics and J. Francois (2007), “Economic Impact of a Potential Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and South Korea”, March. 
Cox, D. and R. Harris (1985), “Trade liberalization and industrial organization: Some estimates 
for Canada”, Journal of Political Economy, 93 (February): 115–45.  
THE IMPACT OF TTIP: THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC MODEL AND COMPARISONS | 53 
 
Del Gatto, M., G. Mion and G. Ireo Paolo Ottaviano (2006), CEPR Discussion Papers 5730, 
CEPR, London. 
Dunlop, C.A., M. Maggetti, C.M. Radaelli and D.J. Russel (2012), “The Many Uses of 
Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Meta-Analysis of EU and UK Cases”, Regulation and 
Governance, Vol. 6(1), pp. 23-45. 
Ecorys (2009a), “Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Investment. An Economic 
Analysis”. 
Ecorys (2009b), “The impact of Free Trade Agreements in the OECD. The impact of an EU-US 
FTA, EU-Japan FTA and EU-Australia/New Zealand FTA”. 
Ecorys (2012), “Study on “EU-US HLGroup – Final Report”, Report to the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, October. 
Ethier, W. (1982), “National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of 
International Trade”, American Economic Review, 72:389-405. 
European Commission (2006), “Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment”, DG 
Trade, March. 
European Commission and Government of Canada (2008), “Assessing the costs and benefits 
of a closer EU–Canada Economic Partnership”. 
European Commission (2009), ”Impact Assessment Guidelines”, SEC(2009) 92 
(http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf). 
European Commission (2012), Impact Assessment Report on EU-Japan Trade Relations 
accompanying the document, “Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the 
opening of negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and 
Japan”, Staff Working Document 209 final, Brussels, 18.7.2012. 
European Commission (2013a), Impact Assessment on the future of the EU-US trade relations 
accompanying the document “Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the 
opening of negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investments agreement, called 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and 
the United States of America”, Staff Working Document 68 final, Strasbourg, 12 March. 
European Commission (2013b), “Opinion: DG TRADE – Impact Assessment on the Future of 
the EU-US Trade Relations”, Impact Assessment Board, SEC (2013). 
Feenstra, R.C (2003), “Advanced International Trade: Theory and evidence”, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Felbermayr, G., B. Heid and S. Lehwald (2013), “Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal? Part 1: Macroeconomic Effects”, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Fillat Castejon, C., J. Francois and Woerz (2008), “Trade through FDI: Investing in Services”, 
IIDE Discussion Papers. 
Fontagne, L., J. Gourdon and S. Jean (2013), ‘’Translatantic Trade: Whiter Partnership, Which 
Economic Consequences? ‘’ CEPII Policy Brief No. 12, CEPII, Paris September. 
Francois, J. (2004), “Assessing the Impact of Trade Policy on Labor Markets and Production”, 
Economie Internationale, CEPII, Paris. 
54  PELKMANS, LEJOUR, SCHREFLER, MUSTILLI & TIMINI 
 
Francois, J., B. Hoekman and J. Woerz (2007), “Does Gravity Apply to Non-Tangibles: Gravity 
Estimates of Trade and FDI Openness in Services”, Plenary Paper, European Trade 
Study Group Meeting, Athens, September. 
Francois, J. and O. Pindyuk (2013), “Modelling the Effects of Free Trade Agreements between 
the EU and Canada, USA and Moldova/Georgia/Armenia on the Austrian Economy: 
Model Simulations for Trade Policy Analysis”, FIW-Research Reports 2012/13, No. 03, 
January. 
Francois, J., O. Pindyuk and J. Woerz (2008), “International Transaction in Services: Data on 
International Trade and FDI in the Service Sectors”, Institute for International 
Development Economics.  
Francois, J. and G. Wignarajan (2008), “Economic Implications of Asian Integration”, Global 
Economy Journal, 8:1-46. 
Frankel, J.A. and D. Romer (1999), “Does trade cause growth”, American Economic Review, 
89(3):379–399. 
Fritsch, O., C.M. Radaelli and L. Schrefler (2013), “Comparing the content of the regulatory 
impact assessments in the UK and the EU”, Public Money & Management, Vol. 33(6), pp. 
445-452. 
Gelauff, G.M.M. and A.M. Lejour (2005), “Five Lisbon highlights: The economic impact of 
reaching these targets”, CPB Document 104. 
GTAP (2014), www.gtap.org. 
Hanslow, K., T. Phamduc, and G. Verikios (2000), “The Structure of the FTAP model” 
Conference Paper, Third Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Melbourne, 
June. 
Harris, R. (1984), “Applied general equilibrium analysis of small open economies with scale 
economies and imperfect competition”, American Economic Review , 74 (December): 1016–
32.  
Helpman, E. and P. Krugman (1985), Market Structure and International Trade, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Hertel, T.W. (ed) (1997), Global trade analysis: Modelling and applications, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kommerskollegium (2013), “Potential Effects from an EU-US Free Trade Agreement – Sweden 
in Focus”, Report. 
Konan, D.E. and A. Van Assche (2004), “Regulation, Market Structure and Service Trade 
Liberalization: A CGE Analysis”, GTAP Working Papers. 
Koyama, T. and S.S. Golub (2006), “OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Revision 
and Extension to more Economies”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment. 
Krugman, P.R. (1979), “Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International 
Trade”, Journal of International Economics, 9:469-479. 
Krugman, P.R. (1980), “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade”, 
American Economic Review, 70:950-959. 
Lejour, A. and R. A. de Mooij (2005), “Turkish Delight – Does Turkey’s accession to the EU 
bring economic benefits?”, CESifo Working Paper Series, No. 1183. 
THE IMPACT OF TTIP: THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC MODEL AND COMPARISONS | 55 
 
Lejour, A.M. and R. Nahuis (2005), “R&D spillovers and growth: Specialisation matters”, 
Review of International Economics, 13, pp. 927-944. 
Lejour, A.M. and H. Rojas-Romagosa (2006), “Foreign direct investment in applied general 
equilibrium models: Overview of the literature”, CPB Memorandum 169. 
Lejour, A.M., P. Veenendaal, G. Verweij and N.I.M. van Leeuwen (2006), “WorldScan: a model 
for international economic policy analysis”, CPB Document 111. 
Lejour, A.M., H. Rojas-Romagosa and G. Verweij (2008), “Opening Services Markets within 
Europe: Modelling Foreign Establishments in a CGE Framework”, Economic Modelling. 
Lloyd, P.J. and X.G. Zhang (2006), “The Armington Model”, Australian Government 
Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper. 
Markusen, J.R. (2002), Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Markusen, J.R. and K.E. Maskus (2002), “Discriminating among alternative theories of the 
multinational enterprise”, Review of International Economics, 14, pp. 694-707.  
McKibbin, W.J. and P.J. Wilcoxen (1999), “The theoretical and empirical structure of the G-
Cubed Memorandum 5b of the Australian Productivity Commission”, Canberra model, 
Economic modelling 16, pp. 123-148. 
OECD, “Public Procurement for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth: Enabling reform through 
evidence and peer reviews”, Paris (www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/ 
PublicProcurementRev9.pdf). 
Petri, P.A. (1997), “Foreign Direct investment in a computable general equilibrium 
framework”, Paper prepared for the Conference, Making APEC work: Economic 
Challenges and Policy Alternatives, March 13-14, Keio University, Tokyo. 
Rutherford, T. (1999), “Applied General Equilibrium modeling with MPSGE as a GAMS 
Subsystem: An Overview of the Modeling Framework and Syntax”, Computational 
Economics, 14, pp. 1-46. 
Tinbergen, J. (1962), Shaping the World Economy, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, NY. 
Trionfetti, F. (2000), “Discriminatory Public Procurement and International Trade”, World 
Economy, 23(1):57-76. 
UNEP (2005), Handbook on Integrated Assessment of Trade-related Measures, United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP). 
United States-European Union High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) 
(2013), “Final Report”, 11 February (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/ 
february/tradoc_150519.pdf). 
Van der Mensbrugghe, D. (2001), “Linkage Technical Reference document”, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
Vogel, L. (2009), “Macroeconomic effects of cost savings in public procurement”, Economic 
papers 389, Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
Woolridge, J.M. (2012), Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, Andover, UK: S.W. 
Cengage Learning. 
 
  
56  PELKMANS, LEJOUR, SCHREFLER, MUSTILLI & TIMINI 
 
Annex I. Main findings of the CEPR report 
Figures AI.1 and AI.2below show the main results of the CGE modelling (changes in GDP both 
in percentage and in millions of euros) by comparing all the policy options previously 
mentioned. One notices immediately that the greatest benefits come from a comprehensive 
agreement that also aims at (partially) removing non-tariff measures on goods, services and 
procurement. In particular, the ambitious experiment, by removing at least 50% of the 
actionable NTBs, could in the long run generate a gain of up to €120 billion for the EU (see 
Figure AI.2), equal to a change in GDP of almost 0.5%.  
Figure AI.1. Change in GDP (%), 2027 benchmark, 20% direct spill-overs 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
Figure AI.2. Change in GDP (€ million), 2027 benchmark, 20% direct spill-overs. 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
If results on economic welfare have shown the final potential impacts of more or less deepened 
EU-US economic relations, a trade agreement is of course negotiated primarily to boost trade 
and investment flows between the two economies. In this respect, Table AI.1 provides a 
general overview of the percentage changes of extra-EU total exports, imports and terms of 
trade according to different scenarios. 
As also noticed for output changes (Figure AI.1), the limited agreement would bring modest 
gains (all less than 1%) in particular with the liberalisation of services and procurement only. 
Also changes in terms of trade for both signatories can be considered almost non-existent. 
Only tariff removal could yield changes larger than 1%, in particular for US exports. 
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Impacts change significantly under the hypothesis of a comprehensive free trade agreement, 
where the changes in value of trade flows and terms of trade stem from the liberalisation of 
tariffs, NTBs in goods and services, and direct and indirect spill-overs. Surprisingly, impacts 
on public procurement liberalisation have not been considered for the total figure although 
they would seem as important as the direct and indirect spill-overs. According to the CGE 
estimates, the ambitious scenario should augment extra-EU exports by €219.27 billion (while 
for the US the impact is slightly greater). 
Table AI.1. Changes (%) of extra-EU exports, imports and terms of trade 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
Figure AI.3 shows the main drivers of the changes reported in the previous table for an 
ambitious scenario. Non-tariff measures in goods play the biggest role for both EU and US 
exports and imports, immediately followed by total tariff removal stimulating US exports by 
almost 2%. The role of NTBs in services is negligible and smaller than direct and indirect spill-
overs.  
On sustainability impacts, we see in Figure AI.4 that wages are expected to rise by up to 0.5%, 
with even higher rises for the EU (slightly lower for skilled jobs) in the ambitious scenario. 
Reallocation effects across sectors also show an increase in employment – which does not mean 
new jobs; rather, it refers to workers changing sectors – in motor vehicles with a strong 
contraction (7%) in electrical machinery and metals (1.61%). For the US, expansions are 
expected in other machinery (1.49%) and transport equipment (0.72%) while contractions 
would take place mainly in electrical machinery (2.07%) and motor vehicles (2.77%).  
Figure AI.3. Drivers of changes in exports and imports (in %), 2027 benchmark, ambitious agreement 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
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Figure AI.4. Changes in wages for less and more skilled labour, total effects (%), 2027 benchmark, 
20% direct spill-overs) 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
The displacement effect72 that derives from labour reallocation is showed in Figure AI.5. The 
picture shows how less and more of the skilled labour work force will be displaced following 
the trade liberalisation in order to keep the market in equilibrium. In fact, as CGE models do 
not allow for unemployment, the only possible result is workers’ displacement from sector A 
to sector B, possibly at an adjusted wage rate. Effects again are greater for a more ambitious 
scenario and slightly more so for the EU. 
Figure AI.5. Displacement Index of less and more skilled labour in the EU and US 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
Other impacts to be taken into account are changes in CO2 emissions and use of natural 
resources. While the second impact is expected to be negligible, almost close to zero in all 
scenarios, changes in CO2 emission are expected to be positive and up to (in total) 4 and 11.3 
thousand metric tonnes, in the less and more ambitious scenario respectively. Estimates for 
the EU are smaller (2.7 and 3.6) and can be potentially lowered depending on the future in the 
emissions trading schemes. 
 Sectoral Effects 
The CEPR study (2013a) might possibly be more directly useful for TTIP negotiators when it 
comes to the analysis of sectoral effects. This does not necessarily mean that the ongoing 
                                                   
72 The labour displacement index comes from Francois (2004) and Francois, Jensen and Peters (2012) and 
summarises labour reallocation across the sectors. 
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negotiations will be driven by the policy suggestions put forward by the authors. However, 
due to the structure and assumptions of this exercise, the study suggests the sectors that could 
be most affected by the (partial) removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
In Figure AI.6, Francois et al. (2013) provide an indicator73 reflecting the interaction of the 
actionability of NTBs and tariffs, the value-added share of exports and the price elasticity of 
demand. The impact ranking shows that the manufacturing sector is the most affected given 
the highest valued-added in exports to the US, in particular in motor vehicles, chemicals and 
processed foods. The next step is to test the solidity of this ranking.74 
Figure AI.6. Impact ranking index 
 
Note: The index is calculated according to the following method: Actionable NTBs + tariffs x Export Value Added 
Share x price elasticities x .01. 
Source: CEPR (2013a).  
Table AI.2 reports the changes in EU output foreseen by 2027 in the different sectors: by 
comparing the policy options with respect to the baseline scenario, we see that in the 
hypothesis of a limited agreement all the EU sectors are either almost not affected or affected 
to a very limited extent. All the changes in EU output by 2027 are expected to be inferior to 
1%, with relatively larger gains under the possibility of tariff removal only. Among them, 
manufacturing is relatively more affected (motor vehicles, transport equipment and electrical 
machinery). Changes in US output (not reported here) are not dramatically different, except a 
negative impact of 1.4% for electrical machinery. In a comprehensive free trade agreement, 
impacts are larger but in absolute terms relatively small. The only outlier is electronic 
machinery, expected to decrease by 3.74% in the less ambitious scenario and 7.3% in the 
ambitious one. 
Another interesting result is the one zooming in on the main drivers of the sectoral impacts 
listed in Table AI.2. 
In this regard, Figure AI.7 considers the sectors most affected under the scenario of an 
ambitious agreement and their drivers. 
                                                   
73 Based on a partial equilibrium exercise. 
74 Procedure based on a general equilibrium context, thus considering the interaction among the 
different sectors.  
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The decompositions of motor vehicles and electrical equipment are revealing since they are 
characterised by two opposite effects. Indeed, if the (positive) change of EU output in the 
motor vehicles sector is almost totally due to removal of NTBs in manufacturing, it is the direct 
spill-overs that negatively affect electrical machinery. As also stressed by the authors, the 
removal of NTBs in this picture presents different results compared to what was expected by 
partial equilibrium results. In this regard, modelling characteristics must be taken into 
account: in a context of general equilibrium, sectors interact, so what can be intepreted as a 
driver in a partial equilibrium exercise does not necessarily dominate in a CGE exercise. 
Table AI.2. Changes in EU output by sector (%), 2027 benchmark, 20% of direct spill-overs 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
Figure AI.7. Decomposition of EU output changes under the ambitious scenario 
 
Source: CEPR (2013a). 
Baseline shares in 
value added
Tariffs 
Only
Services 
Only
Procurement 
Only
Less 
Ambitious Ambitious
Agr Forestry and fisheries 0.04 0.03 0 0 0.05 0.06
Other primary sectors 0.019 0 0 0 0.01 0.02
Processed foods 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.3 0.57
Chemicals 0.028 -0.11 -0.01 0.12 0.09 0.37
Electrical Machinery 0.004 -0.31 0.02 0.06 -3.74 -7.28
Motor vehicles 0.015 -0.65 -0.01 0.3 0.24 1.54
Other Trasport equipment 0.007 -0.26 -0.02 0.09 -0.17 -0.08
Other machinery 0.037 0.35 -0.04 0.03 0.4 0.37
Metals and metal products 0.021 0.03 -0.03 -0.39 -0.71 -1.5
Wood and paper products 0.023 0.06 0 -0.01 0.08 0.08
Other manufactures 0.029 0.6 -0.01 0.01 0.69 0.79
Water Transport 0.003 0.14 -0.04 0.03 0.55 0.99
Air Trasport 0.003 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.3 0.44
Finance 0.032 0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.23 0.42
Insurance 0.01 0.06 0.32 0.01 0.44 0.83
Business Services 0.222 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.25
Communications 0.023 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.1 0.17
Construction 0.083 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.31 0.53
Personal Services 0.035 0.04 0.02 0 0.15 0.26
Other (public) services 0.338 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.28
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On the trade side, EU imports and exports are expected to increase in all sectors (with the 
exception of electrical machinery), in particular, motor vehicles, chemicals and metals. In 
motor vehicles, EU exports to the US will increase with 71% and 148% in the less and more 
ambitious scenarios, respectively. Imports from the US to the EU in the same sector will rise 
even higher (207% and 346% in the less and more ambitious scenarios, respectively). 
 Impact of Investment NTBs 
A gravity equation is applied to estimate the impacts of NTB removal on EU and US affiliates’ 
activities in the two regions. A gravity model works with pairwise observations and is not a 
general equilibrium model: for this reason, its results cannot be compared to CGE results listed 
previously (see chapter 3). This implies that bilateral foreign affiliates’ activities are explained 
by a group of pairwise control variables. Among them, we want to isolate the coefficients (read 
in terms of elasticities) of NTBs and their impact on three specific dependent variables: 
i. level of FDI income, 
ii. number of affiliates from the EU to US and vice versa and 
iii. number of employees in every affiliate. 
Table AI.3 reports the main results. In particular we have to focus our attention on the second 
row showing coefficients for the effects of changes in the level of non-tariff measures on three 
variables. As we can see from the row in bold, a reduction of 10% of the NTBs index (implying 
in practice a convergence or mutual recognition between the two regulatory schemes that 
allow firms to be established on the other side of the ocean) could bring a 5.057% increase in 
FDI income. 
Table AI.3. Summary of regression estimates for NTBs and FDI 
 FDI INCOME NUMBER OF 
ENTERPISES 
NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYEES 
LOG DISTANCE -0.5381*** -0.9525*** -0.9773*** 
LOG NTBS INDEX 
FOR FDI 
-0.5057*** -0.3463*** -0.3136*** 
LOG NETWORK 
INDEX 
0.2188*** 1.1177*** 0.6728*** 
Notes: Observations are (respectively) 11,140; 8,304; 7,253. Standard errors are not reported; 
 *** denotes significant at 1% level. 
Unlike in the CGE modelling, results of the gravity equations on FDI do not change in different 
policy options. Indeed, not being an equilibrium model, there is no need to replicate an 
exogenous shock (as it has been done previously) and see how this affects the economic 
variables. However, this does not imply that the degree of ambition in the negotiation is a 
negligible variable. Indeed, the greater the level of ambition in reducing the NTBs index the 
larger the impact will be on FDI income between the two economies.  
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Annex II. Possible extensions of CGE modelling 
NTBs 
Another important mechanism is the inclusion of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Older bilateral 
and multilateral free trade agreements focused mainly on a reduction of import tariffs in 
manufacturing, but the lower these import barriers became, the more the focus was redirected 
towards NTBs, quite often with the successful EU internal market in mind. These NTBs raise 
production costs, just as import tariffs do, but it is less clear which agents benefit from these 
barriers. Of course, local producers benefit because of less foreign competition, but it is less 
clear whether NTBs generate income in the same way import tariffs create revenues for the 
government. The CGE analysis on the TIPP by CEPR includes an informative box on cost-
creating and rent-extracting (with income) NTBs. It is hard to find empirical evidence on the 
size of the NTBs for each relevant country and economic sector, and to distinguish between 
cost-creating and rent-extracting NTBs.  
The NTBs are often modelled like import tariffs, as a mark-up on the production costs. A lower 
NTB has two main effects.75 First, changes in relative prices imply that countries can better 
exploit their comparative advantages. This causes trade creation, increases production 
efficiency and raises welfare. At the same, however, there can be trade diversion. Rising 
imports by FTA partners come at the expense of imports from other countries. With the lower 
NTBs, these countries receive less preferential treatment. Although often mentioned in the 
theoretical literature, these diversion effects are small in most CGE analyses. The second effect 
is a terms-of-trade effect.76 This is different for import tariffs where globally terms-of-trade 
effects cancel out: some counties experience positive terms-of-trade effects and other countries 
negative effects. With NTBs the terms-of-trade gains can be positive for every country. The 
reason is that the reduction of NTBs entails a reduction in real trade costs if they are cost-
creating. This is also an important driver for the trade and welfare effects of CGE models. 
However, if the NTBs are rent-extracting, this is different. In this case, the reduction of NTBs 
also implies income and welfare losses for the beneficiaries of the rents. The outcomes of the 
models are thus sensitive for the distinction between cost-creating and rent extracting-barriers. 
Imperfect competition 
One of the first extensions was the modelling of imperfection competition and economies of 
scale. The traditional CGE models were based on perfect competition in all markets. This 
implied that firms did not make any profits in the end: marginal costs were equal to the 
average costs and the price. As a consequence, economies of scale could not be modelled, 
implying that the doubling of production also implied a doubling of the production costs. In 
many manufacturing sectors and also in services, however, economies of scale are important. 
Researchers have built this mechanism into most models, such as the GTAP model. They 
model a production function with fixed costs for production and constant marginal costs. 
When setting the price, firms put a mark-up on the marginal production costs. As production 
increases, average costs decline due to the mitigating effect of the fixed costs in total 
production costs. In equilibrium firm profits are zero: the mark-up times the sales volume 
equals the fixed costs of production. This condition determines the number of firms in a 
                                                   
75 See among others Lejour and de Mooij (2005) for an extensive discussion of these effects. 
76 Notice that this effect is not a traditional terms-of-trade effect, but the result of a change in transaction 
costs, modelled by a change in the ‘Samuelsonian iceberg’ costs. When assumed to be of ‘Samuelsonian 
iceberg’ form, transportation costs are modelled as if a part of the good transported would melt while 
being carried from the place of departure A to the point of arrival B. 
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market. The main problem with this mechanism is to fix empirically the ratio between fixed 
and marginal costs. Although much research has estimated production functions, the size of 
this sector specific ratio is subject to a great deal of uncertainty. However, the quantitative 
estimates of these ratios and thereby the degree of scale economics have a large impact on the 
outcome of FTA analyses in CGE models. Nowadays this mechanism is often used for FTA 
analysis, and also for most bilateral agreements negotiated by the EU.  
Services and trade facilitation 
Another extension is trade in services. In the 1990s free trade negotiations focused on the 
elimination of import tariffs, mainly in manufacturing and later also in agriculture. Services 
and services data were neglected. The latter were also hardly available. Only in the beginning 
of the 2000s developed countries started to report bilateral services trade on a large scale. Until 
then bilateral services trade data were mainly approximated from total services exports and 
imports by country and the relative importance of bilateral goods trade. Starting from the 
database for 2004, GTAP also includes the bilateral services trade data from statistical offices, 
which improves the credibility of services trade liberalisation proposals. Moreover, 
researchers also start to estimate NTBs in a similar way as was done for the NTBs in goods 
trade with the same weaknesses. 
A few years later, the topic of trade facilitation appeared at the negotiation tables. Import 
tariffs and other non-tariff barriers are one thing, but time-consuming and cost-raising 
customs procedures or shipments at airports and harbours add significantly to total transport 
time and costs. The indicators of World Banks Doing Business reports illustrated great 
differences between custom procedures in various countries. The GTAP consortium has data 
on international transport and these costs are also modelled as mark-up on the export price. 
This mark-up is often called the ‘transport margin’ and is empirically determined based on 
international transport data. The transport sector delivers these services. By lowering the 
mark-up or increasing productivity in the transport sector, international transport becomes 
cheaper, which exerts downward pressure on import prices and export products become more 
competitive in foreign markets. As a consequence, firms can better specialise and exploit their 
economies of scale. Input factors are reallocated towards more productive sectors, creating 
extra production, consumption and welfare. 
Dynamic effects and productivity improvements 
Most CGE models are static in the sense that the accumulation of capital over time, 
productivity improvements and economic growth are ignored. The welfare gains in these 
models are mainly due to the reallocation of production factors such that comparative 
advantages can be better exploited. Besides, terms-of-trade effects can have a positive or 
negative effect on welfare. We know from empirical work on trade openness and economic 
growth that it can take decades before the full gains of free trade are realised. Extra trade 
increases competition, which stimulates productivity, because the least efficient firms will 
cease to exist and the more efficient ones expand production.77 Moreover, extra foreign 
competition also stimulates exchange of ideas and inventions and can induce firms to increase 
R&D efforts in order to escape fierce competition. Some CGE models are dynamic in the sense 
that investments in year t increase the capital stock in t+1 and so on until equilibrium is 
                                                   
77 There have been some efforts to link multi-sector and multi-regional CGE models with models that 
can handle efficiency gains from trade liberalisation, but these have not become popular (Del Gatto et 
al., 2006).   
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reached. Examples are the Linkage model of the World Bank, the World Scan model of CPB 
and G-cube model of McKibbin and Wilcoxen.78 Also the GTAP model has a dynamic version. 
These models are more complicated and not so easy to use as static models. The former are 
often used for scenario analysis with a long time dimension and have to be ‘fuelled’ by 
assumptions on population and labour growth, productive improvements and so on. For trade 
analyses these models have never become very popular, or at least not compared to the static 
GTAP model. One solution for simulating the capital accumulation effects is to increase the 
total amount of capital in the model based on a fixed rule such as a constant capital GDP ratio. 
This increases the outcomes of trade liberalisation simulations, but other dynamic effects such 
as productivity improvements are not modelled. 
The gains of trade do not only consist of terms-of-trade effects, reallocation effects and 
productivity improvements due to increased efficiency. Feenstra (2003) argues that firms also 
benefit from intermediate inputs, because they increase the variety of these inputs and embody 
knowledge. Trade increases knowledge spill-overs, which could have positive effects on 
productivity. There are some large-scale econometric models, such as the Quest model and 
Nemesis, which include R&D and knowledge spill-overs, but in multi-sector and multi-
country CGE modelling R&D is absent.79 The lack of dynamic mechanisms between trade and 
productivity in the CGE models explains the modest effects from FTAs and the discrepancy 
with the ex post outcomes. 
Computer General Equilibrium modelling of foreign direct investment  
There are large-scale computational general equilibrium (CGE) models for analysing trade 
policies,80 but the general equilibrium effects of FDI flows are not widely examined in applied 
models.81 Petri (1997) and Markusen (2002) conducted research on the microeconomic 
underpinnings of FDI and incorporated their ideas in general equilibrium models. The FTAP 
(Hanslow et al., 2000) model, which is an extension of the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), 
incorporates most of the insights of Petri (1997) on modelling FDI in a CGE framework. 82 The 
main insight is the distinction between domestic and foreign ownership of firms in the model. 
Consumers first decide on the location where the variety is produced, then on the region of 
ownership of the firm. Their treatment assumes that from a Korean perspective, for example, 
a US multinational located in Korea is a closer substitute for a Korean-owned firm than it is 
for a US firm located in the United States. FTAP models barriers to establishment and to 
ongoing operations of foreign subsidiaries. The former are modelled as taxes on the movement 
of capital, the latter as taxes on output of the firms. These barriers are based on extensive 
                                                   
78 See Van de Mensbrugghe (2001), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999), Lejour et al. (2006), for example. 
79 An exception is the WorldScan model. Lejour and Nahuis (2005) estimate sectoral and international 
spill-over effects, which are incorporated in the model, and Gelauff and Lejour (2006) model an R&D 
sector in WorldScan for analysing the 2010 Lisbon goals. Moreover, there are many dynamic CGE 
models of one country and one sector with endogenous R&D.  
80 Examples of these so-called global CGE models are the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), the Linkage model 
(Van der Mensbrugghe, 2001), the Mirage model (Bchir et al., 2002), Michigan model (Brown and Stern, 
2001), G-Cubed model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999), WorldScan model (Lejour et al., 2006), and the 
model of Rutherford (1999). 
81 Recently, many empirical papers have been published on FDI flows and the productivity of FDI. See 
Blonigen (2005) for a review of the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI, and Rojas-Romagosa 
(2006) on the productivity effects and the references included there.  
82 Petri’s framework was later incorporated in other CGE models: the Michigan model (Brown and 
Stern, 2001), the model of Lee and Van der Mensbrugghe (2001), and the MIRAGE model (Bchir et al., 
2002). However, most of these models apply some minor changes to the original framework of Petri. 
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empirical estimations by sector. Both taxes discriminate by ownership, which could imply an 
unfavourable treatment for foreign-owned firms. The barriers create rents and FTAP assumes 
that these rents accrue to the owners of the firms. They receive abnormal high returns because 
they were lucky to surpass the barriers while other potential entrants were not. Dee and 
Hanslow (2000) present the FTAP model results for global post-Uruguay round services trade 
liberalisation. The purpose of this paper was to assess the relative importance of services trade 
liberalisation compared to the liberalisation of agriculture and manufacturing.  
The seminal work on modelling FDI decisions is from Markusen (2002). Markusen models 
trade and investment decisions of multinationals in a general equilibrium framework. The 
basic idea is that multinationals decide to serve the foreign market by exporting goods or 
services or by establishing a foreign daughter company. This decision depends on the size of 
the market, the distance, transportation costs and barriers to foreign direct investment. The 
multinational also has the option to outsource a part of the production based on cost 
advantages. A firm establishing an affiliate abroad also transfers firm-specific knowledge to 
that affiliate. This assumption implies that capital is more substitutable between countries 
within a specific sector than between sectors within a country. Markusen works out his ideas 
in two-country models. In spite of all his simplifying assumptions the models are complicated 
and cannot be solved analytically. He often uses simulations to assess the importance of the 
characteristics for the foreign investment decisions. This complexity is probably one of the 
main reasons why his ideas have not been frequently incorporated in large-scale CGE models. 
A second reason is a lack of data on bilateral FDI flows and stocks by sector, and on the 
transfers of specific knowledge and capital between the headquarters and the daughter 
companies of the multinational. 
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Annex III. Main findings from previous FTA assessments 
‘Armingtonian’ sector market structure: It implies inter-sector perfect competition. 
Differentiation of products is conceived as horizontal and national. Thus products, e.g. goods 
or services, traded are differentiated by geographical origin, i.e. region or country, and their – 
imperfect – substitutability with ‘local’ products is assessed by the so-called ‘Armington 
parameter’ or elasticity of substitution. The higher the elasticity, the greater will be the 
substitutability of products (Armington, 1969). Following the assumptions in the Armington 
model, the number of commodities, i.e. products, is modelled as unvarying in number 
(product differentiation is therefore exogenous) (Lloyd and Zhang, 2006).  
‘Monopolistic competition’ sector market structure: Firms are in direct competition amongst 
each other through the channel of firm-driven product differentiation (here treated as 
endogenous). This option reflects the ‘new trade theory’ approach and accounts for an 
increased product variety, which will benefit both intermediate and final consumers through 
productivity enhancement and – potentially – a greater real purchasing power (Krugman 1979, 
1980; Ethier, 1982; Helpman and Krugman, 1985).  
A summary for market structures used in the EU-US, EU-Japan and EU-Canada IAs is 
provided in Table AIII.1 
Table AIII.1. Modelled sectors and market structure in different IAs 
Sectors EU-US EU-
Japan 
EU-
Canada 
EU-US (20 
sectors)1 
EU-Japan (20 sectors)1 EU-Canada (31 
sectors)1 Market structure 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fisheries 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries 
Agriculture 
A2 A 
A 
Fishing A 
Other primary 
sectors Other primary sectors 
Coal 
A A 
A 
Oil A 
Gas A 
Minerals nec4 A 
Processed foods Food & beverages 
Processed foods 
MoCp3 MoCp 
MoCp 
Beverages & tobacco 
products MoCp 
Wood and paper 
products 
Wood and paper 
products 
Wood products 
A A MoCp Paper products, 
publishing 
Chemicals Chemicals and related products 
Chemical, rubber, 
plastic products MoCp MoCp MoCp 
Metals and metal 
products 
Metals and metal 
products 
Mineral products nec 
A A 
MoCp 
Ferrous metals MoCp 
Metals nec MoCp 
Metal products MoCp 
Motor vehicles Automotive Motor vehicles & parts A MoCp MoCp 
Other transport 
equipment Transport equipment 
Transport equipment 
nec A A MoCp 
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Electrical 
machinery/ 
Other machinery5 
Electrical machinery/ 
Machinery5 
Machinery & 
equipment nec/ 
Electronic equipment5 
MoCp MoCp MoCp 
Other 
manufactures Other manufactures 
Petroleum, coal 
products 
MoCp MoCp 
MoCp 
Textiles MoCp 
Wearing apparel MoCp 
Leather products MoCp 
Manufactures nec MoCp 
Construction Construction Construction A A MoCp 
Water transport Water transport 
Transportation 
A A 
A 
Air transport Air transport A A 
Communications Communications Communication A A MoCp 
Business services Business and ICT services Business services A A MoCp 
Finance Finance 
Other services6 
A A 
A Insurance Insurance A A 
Personal services Personal services A A 
Other services Other services 
Utilities 
A A 
A 
Trade MoCp 
Other services6 A 
1 Number of sectors according to market structure definition in the IAs.  
2 A= Armington. 
3 MoCp= Monopolistic competition. 
4 Not elsewhere classified. 
5 Two separate sectors in the paper, but for the purpose of coherence among sectors and among papers they are 
grouped in the same cell. Both markets are treated as MoCp. 
6 Repeated for the purpose of coherence. Blue or green fill = correspondent market structure(s) are coherently 
defined among all the IAs (respectively, Armington or Monopolistic Competition). Red fill = Discrepancies among 
the correspondent market structures. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission (2013), Copenhagen Economics (2009), European 
Commission and Government of Canada (2008). 
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Table AIII.2. Macroeconomic projections: A comparative assessment 
Macroeconomic 
indicator 
Impact 
assessment 
Country 
EU US Canada Japan Others 
GDP 
(annualised 
growth, in %) 
EU-US 
agreement 
2.28 
(2001-
2007) 
0.70 
(2007-
2016) 
1.17 
(2007-
27) 
 
3.30 (2001-
2007) 
1.74 (2007-
2016) 
1.90 (2007-
27) 
 
Included 
in “Other 
OECD” 
Included in 
“Other 
OECD” 
Different 
projections1 for 
“Other OECD” 
(2.54; 1.84; 2.02); 
“Eastern 
Europe” (6.55; 
2.03; 3.20), 
“Mediterranean
” (4.98; 3.55; 
3.93), China 
(11.21; 9.06; 
8.24), India (7.91; 
7.53; 6.19), 
ASEAN (5.70; 
5.01; 5.19), 
MERCOSUR 
(4.28; 3.86; 3.97), 
“Low Income” 
(5.94; 5.43; 5.56), 
and “Rest of the 
World” (6.12; 
3.81; 4.41) 
EU-Japan 
agreement 
“The model is projected to 2018 using IMF growth projections of the 
world economy” 
EU-Canada 
agreement2 
2.55 
(2007-
14) 
Included in 
“Rest of the 
World” 
2.68 
(2007-14) 
Included in 
“Rest of the 
World” 
“Rest of the 
World” 
4.45 (2007-14) 
1 Projections inside each set of parentheses report values for, respectively, 2001-2007; 2007-2016; 2007-2027. 
2 In the report are also explicitly noted the following assumptions: real oil prices +82% and real grain prices +68% 
during the period 2004-2014. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission (2013), Copenhagen Economics (2009) and European 
Commission and Government of Canada (2008). 
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Table AIII.3. Scenarios and changes in GDP baseline (%): A comparative look 
Scenario Baseline Tariffs only Services only Procurement only 
Description Year Doha FTAs Tariffs reduction RES. 
NTBs reduction 
(services only) 
Spill-
overs RES. 
NTBs 
reduction 
(procur. only) 
Spill-overs RES. 
EU-US 2027 No1 Yes1 2 - 98% 
EU:+0.10 
US:+0.04 
- 10% Yes (20%)5 
EU:+0.
02 
US:+0.03 
- 25% Yes (20%)5 
EU:+0.02 
US:+0.01 
EU-Japan 2018 No3 No3 n.a.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
EU-Canada 2014 Yes Not spec. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Scenario Comprehensive, Less ambitious 
Description Tariffs reduction 
NTBs reduction (in ‘goods’ or 
‘manufacturing’) NTBs reduction (in services) 
NTBs reduction (in 
procurement) Spill-overs RES. 
EU-US - 98% - 10% (20% of actionable NTBs) - 10% (20% of actionable NTBs) - 25% Yes (20%)5 
EU:+0.277 
US:+0.227 
EU-Japan6 - 100% - ‘minimum reduction scenario’ - ‘minimum reduction scenario’ No No 
EU:+0.108 
Japan:+0.208 
EU-Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Scenario Comprehensive, More ambitious 
Description Tariffs reduction 
NTBs reduction (in ‘goods’ or 
‘manufacturing’) NTBs reduction (in services) 
NTBs reduction (in 
procurement) Spill-overs RES. 
EU-US - 100% - 25% (50% of actionable NTBs) - 25% (50% of actionable NTBs) - 50% Yes (20%)5 
EU:+0.487 
US:+0.397 
EU-Japan9 - 100% - ‘maximum reduction scenario’ - ‘maximum reduction scenario’ No No 
EU:+0.148 
Japan:+0.318 
EU-Canada - 100% - 2% of the ‘value of trade in non-commodity goods sector’ 
- Equivalent to what achieved among 
EU MS No No 
EU:+0.08 
Canada:+0.77 
Note: 1 No information on the baseline scenario provided in CEPR (2013a); details have been obtained consulting European Commission (2013). 2 All FTAs currently in place + EU-Singapore and EU-
Canada as if concluded. Information available on the hypothesis regarding EU-Singapore and EU-Canada agreements, i.e. how they have been modelled in the CGE framework. 3 Robustness of the 
baseline scenario has been tested on hypothetical welfare effects in case of Korea and/or Doha round agreement. The inclusion of these two variables has little effects on estimations. 4 n.a.= Not 
applicable. 5 Robustness of spill-over effects has been tested using a 10% spill-over alternative scenario. Even if cited (p. 33) results are not included in the report. 6 This policy option is called ‘Lower 
bound scenario’. 7 Effect of procurement not included in the total, as calculated in the CEPR report (p. 46). 8 ‘Long-run effects’, i.e. taking into account also changes in returns to labour and capital (thus 
including underlying ‘short-run effects’). Precise short-run effects estimates are not available, but their qualitative description reports: ‘short-run effects imply no measurable change in GDP from a 
full agreement for either the EU or Japan’, Copenhagen Economics (2009), p. 82. 9 This policy option is called ‘Upper bound scenario’. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on CEPR (2013a), Copenhagen Economics (2009), European Commission and Government of Canada (2008), European Commission (2013). 
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Table AIII.4. Satellite studies: Scenarios and changes in GDP baseline (%) 
Scenario Baseline Tariffs only Basic modest Modified modest 
Description Year Doha FTAs Tariffs reduction RES. 
Tariffs 
reduction 
NTBs 
reduction RES. 
Tariffs 
reduction NTBs reduction RES. 
FIW (2013) No relevant data on EU and US: FTAs (between EU and other economies, such as Canada, US, and Moldova/Georgia/Armenia) effects calculated on the Austrian economy only 
Kommerskolle
gium (2013) 2017 
Not 
spec. 
Not 
spec. -100% 
Sweden: 
+0.01 
EU-26:+0.02 
US:+0.02 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ecorys (2012) 2020 No Not spec. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
CEPR (2013b) 2027 Not spec. 
Not 
spec. n.a. n.a. 
-100% except 
limited 
reductions for 
processed food 
-25% of 
‘actionable’ 
NTBs (i.e. 
approx. 
12.5%NTBs) 
UK:+0.14 
EU-26:+0.37 
US:+0.16 
-100% except 
limited 
reductions for 
processed food 
-25% of 
‘actionable’ 
NTBs (i.e. -
12.5%NTBs) 
except 50% 
NTBs in 
chemicals, 
motor vehicles 
UK:+0.17 
EU-26:+0.45 
US:+0.20 
Scenario Comprehensive, Less ambitious 
Description Tariffs reduction 
NTBs reduction (in 
‘goods’ or 
‘manufacturing’) 
NTBs reduction 
(in services) 
NTBs reduction 
(in 
procurement) 
Spill-
overs RES. 
FIW (2013) No relevant data on EU and US: FTAs (between EU and other economies, such as Canada, US, and Moldova/Georgia/Armenia) effects calculated on the Austrian economy only 
Kommerskolle
gium (2013)1 -100% -25% of NTBs -25% of NTBs No No 
Sweden:+0.09 
EU-26:+0.12 
US:+0.24 
Ecorys (2012)1  No -50% of actionable NTBs (25% of NTBs) 
-50% of actionable 
NTBs (25% of NTBs) No No 
Short-run (real 
income change): 
NL:+0.11 
EU-26:+0.16 
US:+0.05 
Long-run (real 
income change): 
NL:+0.32 
EU-26:+0.32 
US:+0.13 
THE IMPACT OF TTIP: THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC MODEL AND COMPARISONS | 71 
 
CEPR (2013b)2 -100% -50% of actionable NTBs (25% of NTBs) 
-50% of actionable 
NTBs (25% of NTBs) No No 
UK:+0.27 
EU-26:+0.61 
US:+0.31 
Scenario Comprehensive, More ambitious 
Description Tariffs reduction 
NTBs reduction (in 
‘goods’ or 
‘manufacturing’) 
NTBs reduction 
(in services) 
NTBs reduction 
(in 
procurement) 
Spill-
overs RES. 
FIW (2013) No relevant data on EU and US: FTAs (between EU and other economies, such as Canada, US, and Moldova/Georgia/Armenia) effects calculated on the Austrian economy only. 
Kommerskolle
gium (2013)3 -100% -50% of NTBs -50% of NTBs No No 
Sweden:+0.18 
EU-26:+0.22 
US:+0.51 
Ecorys (2012)4 No -100% of actionable NTBs (50% of NTBs) 
-100% of 
actionable NTBs 
(50% of NTBs) 
No No 
Short-run (real 
income change): 
NL:+0.25; EU-26:+0.25 
US:+0.13 
Long-run (real 
income change): 
NL:+0.72 
EU-26:+0.73 
US:+0.28 
CEPR (2013b)5 -100% -50% of actionable NTBs 
-50% of actionable 
NTBs (25% of NTBs) 
except 75% NTBs in 
chemicals, motor 
vehicles 
No No 
UK:+0.35 
EU-26:+0.82 
US:+0.39 
Notes: 1 This policy option is called ‘Limited scenario’. 2 This policy option is called ‘Basic ambitious scenario’. 3 This policy option is called ‘Comprehensive scenario’. 4 This policy 
option is called ‘Ambitious scenario’. 5 This policy option is called ‘Modified ambitious scenario’. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on FIW (2013), Kommerskollegium (2013), Ecorys (2012) and CEPR (2013b). 
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